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ABSTRACT  
 
 
Since its inception in 1861 when the first public accounts committee was established 
in the United Kingdom, this oversight mechanism has developed into a model for 
non-executive financial oversight and accountability at the national and provincial 
levels of government throughout the Commonwealth and beyond.  
 
A few municipalities in South Africa have also established public accounts 
committees, but they are a few isolated cases. The hesitance on the part of South 
African municipalities to establish a good governance mechanism with a proven track 
record is a cause of concern, especially in view of the poor financial management 
that prevails throughout the local sphere of government.   
 
In this case study of the public accounts committee established in the City of Cape 
Town in 2006, the researcher explores the feasibility of the implementation of the 
public accounts committee model within the local government sphere in South Africa. 
Twenty internationally recognised public accounts committee practices were 
identified and used to probe the selected case to gain in-depth knowledge of the 
extent to which the committee adheres to these recognised practices.  Where the 
committee deviated from accepted practices, the reasons for the deviation and its 
impact on the effectiveness of the committee were analysed.  Finally, the key lessons 
learnt from the experience of the public accounts committee in the City of Cape Town 
are used in order to make two sets of recommendations: Firstly, recommendations on 
how the public accounts committee of the City of Cape Town can become more 
effective than it currently is – recommendations which are also relevant to any 
municipality wishing to establish a public accounts committee. The second set of 
recommendations is addressed to the national authorities in charge of finance and 
local government, as the challenge of establishing improved governance systems in 
local government is of national importance, and it is within the power of these 
authorities to remove a few key obstacles in the way of establishing municipal public 
accounts committees. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The Republic of South Africa (RSA) is a country faced with vast socio-economic 
challenges, especially poverty and the challenge of bringing quality public services to 
all its citizens. The RSA Constitution requires that all spheres of government, and all 
organs of state, provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government 
for the Republic.  
 
There are three spheres of government in the RSA, viz the national, the provincial 
and the local or municipal sphere of government. The executive and legislative 
authority of a municipality is vested in the municipal council. The municipal sphere is 
where the bulk of service delivery takes place and, as such, where a major portion of 
public funds are spent and where effective oversight over the spending of public 
funds should be in place. However, the municipal sphere faces serious challenges as 
far as governance, accountability and financial management systems are concerned. 
The unacceptably high number of qualified audit reports annually issued by the 
Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) illustrates the serious financial management 
deficiencies in local government. For example, in respect of the 2007-08 financial 
year the AGSA was able to provide a clean bill of health for only 22% of 
municipalities. There have also been a number of instances of civil unrest in a 
number of municipalities recently that have been ascribed inter alia to perceived 
service delivery failures within municipalities. These challenges point to a compelling 
need for corrective action to be taken, which may include the establishment of 
oversight mechanisms, including oversight mechanisms that will enable and facilitate 
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effective management of public resources, improved accountability and generally 
better governance in municipalities. The Minister of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs is convinced that the establishment of municipal oversight 
committees in all municipalities will go a long way towards improving the governance 
situation in municipalities (Shiceka, 2009).  
 
A non-executive oversight mechanism such as a public accounts committee (PAC) 
has the potential to play a key contributing role in determining the success with which 
public funds and other resources are applied or managed in order to successfully 
deliver quality public services.  
 
Internationally, legislatures in the national and sub-national spheres appoint 
committees as their main instruments of oversight. And as far as financial oversight is 
concerned, legislatures appoint the public accounts committee as their key financial 
oversight committee. The main objective of ex post oversight (oversight after the 
event) by a PAC is to hold to account those charged with the use of public funds to 
implement annual plans and priorities, and to look back in order to have an informed 
perspective and insight for purposes of future planning. Although PACs have been 
functioning with varying degrees of success, the PAC has built up a reputation as 
one of the more successful legislative oversight mechanisms.  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that PACs carrying out financial oversight on behalf of 
the national and provincial legislatures have been playing an important role since the 
start of the democratic dispensation in the RSA. Since 1994, PACs have existed at 
Parliament and at the legislatures of the nine provinces in the RSA.  
 
In the municipal sphere of government in South Africa thus far, however, the 
appointment of PACs has been limited. Sixteen years after the birth of democracy in 
the RSA only 48 (17%) of the 283 municipalities in South Africa have established 
MPACs. 
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This research study will attempt to determine what the main obstacles in the way of 
establishing MPACs are, and how these obstacles may be removed. 
 
Given the key role of financial oversight as part of oversight systems in government 
and in relation to public sector governance, it is important to find out more about the 
context within which MPACs are supposed to function. It is important to also identify 
the challenges that should be considered when establishing an MPAC in terms of 
generally accepted PAC traditions as practiced at national and provincial spheres of 
government all over the world, and to establish which practices can be adopted for 
municipal financial oversight in the RSA. 
 
1.2 Background to the study 
 
Substantial literature exists internationally in relation to the importance of PACs as a 
successful oversight mechanism. The literature study reported on in Chapter 2 will 
show that this form of financial oversight mechanism has been very successful in the 
national and sub-national spheres of government, especially in the 170 countries of 
the Commonwealth. Because of this, the researcher was expecting to find 
confirmation in the literature that similar committees would have been established at 
local authorities and with the same success.  However, this was not the case. 
 
Internationally, there is an abundance of literature about the value of PACs as 
oversight mechanisms, often also referred to as scrutiny mechanisms. Since the 
establishment of the first PAC in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom in 
1861, this mechanism of oversight over the spending of public funds has developed 
into a world-wide model, especially in the commonwealth countries where it is 
uncommon to find a legislature without some form of a PAC. In 2008, a review by the 
same Parliament where the PAC was born over two centuries earlier, concluded that 
ensuring financial integrity and regularity was a key role of parliamentary oversight 
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and that the PAC remained the key mechanism fulfilling this role. Sub-national or 
state legislatures throughout the Commonwealth have therefore adopted the PAC 
model as its key ex post oversight committee. 
 
PACs originally concentrated on the regularity of expenditure as reported at the end 
of any particular financial year. However, PACs in the last few decades have 
increasingly also started concentrating on the value received for the public funds that 
are spent (which is also referred to as examination of the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of expenditure) to such an extent that some PACs now focus 
predominantly on this aspect of public spending.  
. 
Ex post (―after the event‖) oversight as practiced by PACs is the key and final stage 
within the public sector cycle of accountability which annually commences with the 
granting of funds to the executive and ends with the executive having to account to 
non-executive public representatives for the spending of the allocated funds. (The 
executive is often referred to as the ―government of the day‖ and is charged with the 
implementation of policy, inter alia by means of spending public funds. In the 
municipal sphere, the executive authority is exercised either by an executive mayor, 
or an executive committee.)  
 
The PAC process therefore involves publicly elected representatives holding the 
executive and executive appointees accountable for the manner in which public 
funds have been used. The presence of this high-level governance process has 
become an important criterion that is used when countries are evaluated on the 
extent to which they comply with governance best practices at national and sub-
national levels.   
 
The drafters of the South African Constitution, by including provisions for legislative 
oversight mechanisms in respect of the national and provincial spheres of 
government, seem to have recognised that scrutiny or oversight of the executive by 
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the legislature is a recognised function of a democratic country. Sections 55 and 114 
of the RSA Constitution require of the National Assembly and the provincial 
legislatures that they establish mechanisms that will maintain oversight of the 
exercise of national and provincial executive authority and organs of state. 
(Unfortunately, the RSA Constitution does not contain a similar provision as far as 
local government is concerned.) Based on the empowering constitutional provisions, 
the principal mechanism of oversight in the South African Parliament and in provincial 
legislatures since the adoption of the RSA Constitution in 1996, has been the PAC.  
The PACs established at Parliament and at the provincial legislatures have very 
similar mandates, namely to examine the annual audited public accounts at the end 
of each financial year, and to report thereon. 
 
It was therefore understandable that, when new local government financial 
management legislation for South Africa was being drafted in 2003, it was proposed 
that the new legislation should provide for the establishment of municipal PACs that 
could fulfil a similar year-end financial oversight role within local government.    
 
1.3 Research problem and objectives 
 
When the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) was adopted in 2003, it 
unfortunately did not clearly and unambiguously provide for the establishment of 
MPACs. The only statutory provision finally taken up in the MFMA in which reference 
to an MPAC is made is in section 129(4)(b) of the said Act where it provides the 
National Treasury with the discretion to issue guidelines for functioning and 
composition ―of any public accounts or oversight committees established by the 
council to assist it to consider an annual report‖.  
 
The establishment of MPACs was therefore not made prescriptive; in fact, the 
provision in the MFMA seems to have created more confusion about the existence of 
MPACs than it has provided clarity, seeing that the production of the ―oversight 
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report‖ required in terms of section 129(1) of the MFMA has, in practice, become the 
main function of an oversight committee or an MPAC. In terms of section 129(1) of 
the MFMA, the council of a municipality must produce an oversight report based on 
the review of the annual report of a municipality. Guidelines issued by the National 
Treasury, as the chief financial regulating authority of the public sector, suggests that, 
in cases where an MPAC exists, it could also double up as the oversight committee 
responsible on behalf the municipal council for the production of the oversight report. 
This suggests that the role of an MPAC is wider than that of a section-129 oversight 
committee. The detailed guidelines issued with regard to the production of a 
municipal oversight report – a report concerned with the quality and adequacy of the 
annual report of the municipality – does not express any view on the functions of an 
MPAC, but only deals with the production of the section-129 oversight report. In 
October 2009, the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
undertook to issue a framework for the functioning of MPACs by the end of 2009, but 
this did not happen. There is, therefore, no statutory obligation or other strong 
policy direction available at present for the establishment of MPACs at local 
authority level.  
 
Table 1.1: 
 
Status of established MPACs in South Africa as at August 2010 
 
Total  
MPACs   
E/Cape F/State Gauteng KZN  
Lim- 
popo 
Mpu-
malanga 
N/Cape N/West  W/Cape 
48 0 0 13 24 1 7 0 0 3 
Source: Written reply by the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs to Question No 
2185 in the National Assembly, dated 20 August 2010 
 
This absence of a statutory or other regulatory framework for the establishment, role 
and functions of MPACs may be a key reason why only 48 municipalities out of a 
total of 283 municipalities in South Africa have thus far established MPACs (see 
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Table 1.1 on the previous page), and why many of these municipalities are struggling 
to define the role and functions of MPACs. Another likely complicating factor is the 
difference in legal construct between the national/provincial and municipal spheres of 
government. The RSA Constitution clearly separates the powers and functions of the 
executive and non-executive authorities in the national and provincial spheres of 
government. For example, there are separate chapters in the RSA Constitution for 
Parliament and the national executive, as well as separate sections in respect of the 
provincial legislative and provincial executive authorities. The RSA Constitution does 
not provide for the same clear separation of powers as far as municipalities are 
concerned, and section 151(2) in fact states that both the executive and the 
legislative authority of a municipality is vested in its municipal council. The RSA 
Constitution also does not explicitly provide an oversight function to the non-
executive component of a municipality to the extent that it provides such a function to 
parliament and the provincial legislatures. 
 
The position created by the weak de jure non-executive oversight function in 
municipalities is further complicated by weak de facto non-executive oversight. 
Members of council who serve on non-executive structures of the council reportedly 
find it difficult to oversee their colleagues who serve in the municipal executive, but 
who are senior members of the same council. This provides additional challenges to 
the accepted PAC model, should attempts be made to apply it within local 
government.  
 
Lastly, there are the challenges that any institutionalisation process is normally faced 
with, such as the resourcing of new structures, such as MPACs, that require 
additional resources and expertise. 
 
It seems, therefore, that the introduction of MPACs as mechanisms of municipal 
financial oversight in South Africa is being delayed by a number of factors, even 
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though MPACs have been mooted as part of the solution to the problem of poor 
municipal governance.  
 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there are municipalities in South Africa that have 
established MPACs. The City of Cape Town (CoCT) was the first municipality to 
establish a PAC, and the researcher has chosen it as the subject of research. (Of the 
six metropolitan areas in South Africa, four others have since also established 
MPACs, viz the City of Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, the City of Tshwane and 
Ethekwini).    
 
1.4 Topic of research and research questions  
 
As the CoCT took the bold step of establishing the first MPAC in South Africa in 
2006, it was decided that a case study of the CoCT PAC three years into its 
existence would provide suitable material for exploring the research problem. 
 
Adopting the PAC model for financial oversight in South African municipalities – 
a case study of the PAC in the City of Cape Town  
 
The specific research questions that the researcher endeavoured to answer are 
the following: 
 
 What is the background to and history of the establishment of the PAC in the 
City of Cape Town (CoCT)?  
 To what extent does the PAC in the CoCT adhere to generally accepted PAC 
practice? 
 What are the key lessons to be learnt thus far in relation to the PAC in the CoCT, 
and how could it guide other municipalities still intending to establish a PAC?  
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The insight gained from the answers to the above questions inform the challenges 
faced by municipalities throughout the RSA as far the establishment and effective 
functioning of financial oversight mechanisms are concerned. The research results 
were expected to hold potential significance for policy makers within the RSA as far 
as policy shortcomings are concerned, but also to indicate which practices support  
effective and efficient financial oversight. 
 
1.5 Relevance of the research  
 
The research was regarded as relevant on the basis of the following considerations: 
 
 Service delivery within the local government sphere is a national priority, and 
proper oversight within the local government sphere is weak. MPACs have the 
potential to strengthen oversight and governance within local government, which 
would have a positive bearing on financial management, the effective, efficient 
and economic use of scarce public resources and, ultimately, on service delivery. 
 
 The establishment of MPACs has been very slow. This may to a significant 
degree be the result of poor policy direction from the relevant authorities and the 
absence of a clear framework to guide the composition, functions and powers of 
MPACs. It was expected that the research study would advise concerning the 
type of guidance that should be provided by the relevant authorities.    
 
 A considered determination of the challenges faced by MPACs could enable 
interested parties to respond to the challenges through appropriate corrective 
action. Suggestions derived through the research will be made on possible ways 
in which to address the challenges alluded to above.  
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1.6 Research design and methodology 
 
This research study was commenced with a review of the available literature on the 
subject of financial oversight committees, especially the PAC as an internationally 
recognised and established mechanism of financial oversight. The researcher 
planned to pay particular attention to the key attributes identified in the available 
literature regarding the common and essential features of a PAC.  
 
This was to be followed by a review of the legislative and regulatory framework 
applicable to financial accountability and oversight in the RSA as the context within 
which PACs operate.   
 
The qualitative research method was selected because of its suitability to interpreting 
and understanding human and organisational behaviour. The research was 
conducted by carrying out a case study of the first MPAC to be established in the 
RSA by studying its regulatory framework and its key areas of operation; by 
observing the MPAC in question as it operated, and by interviewing members of the 
MPAC and other relevant role players on the basis of a number of questions mainly 
relating to the implementation challenges experienced, as well as operational 
successes.  Throughout the research, the researcher was cognisant that he was the 
primary research instrument and that he therefore had to observe with objectivity and 
―without affecting that which is being observed‖ (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2005: 8).  
 
1.7 Research report sequence 
 
In Chapter 1 of the thesis, the research topic is introduced and its relevance 
explained in the context of the PAC as an effective non-executive financial oversight 
mechanism internationally and within the national and provincial spheres in the RSA.  
The research problem is developed and linked to the limited existence of PACs within 
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the municipal sphere of government in the RSA, and specific research questions are 
articulated. The research design and methodology is briefly explained. 
 
Chapter 2 takes an in-depth look at the literature related to the study. Key concepts 
are defined, especially concepts relating to accountability and oversight. A major part 
of the literature review focuses on the PAC as the world standard for financial 
oversight mechanisms and on the manner in which the PAC model has been 
deployed throughout the Commonwealth and beyond. The literature review 
concludes by suggesting that there seems to be no reason why the PAC cannot 
function as a financial oversight mechanism within the municipal sphere in the RSA.  
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview and an analysis of the legislative and regulatory 
framework within which municipalities in the RSA function, and which frames the 
principles of accountability and oversight.  
 
Chapter 4 documents the design and methodology followed during fieldwork. The 
use of the qualitative research method is motivated as well as the choice of the case 
study approach. The selection of the City of Cape Town as the subject of the case is 
explained, as well as the data sources, data accessibility and the selection of the 
respondents. The main research instrument is discussed, as well as the manner in 
which the data were analysed and interpreted.  
 
The research results are outlined in Chapter 5 by means of summarising and 
discussing the significant findings in the context of the literature, and conclusions and 
recommendations are provided.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It is mostly over the last decade or two that literature has appeared on oversight by 
legislatures – the role of committees in this context – and in particular on the role of 
the PAC as a key mechanism of oversight by elected non-executive authorities. It has 
been reported that legislatures have in recent decades innovated and rejuvenated 
themselves in terms of their institutional structures, particularly parliamentary 
committees (Longley & Davidson, 1998:2). Since the 19th century, the PAC has 
played a critical role as one of the key committees of legislatures throughout the 
Commonwealth and beyond (Stapenhurst, Sahgal, Woodley & Pelizzo, 2005:2). The 
PAC is a committee that, according to Wehner, has not ―outlived [its] usefulness‖ 
(2003:13); in fact, it has been pointed out that countries from outside the 
Commonwealth, such as Indonesia, have recently started adopting the PAC model 
as a good governance mechanism in their own legislatures, because of its sound 
reputation (Loney, 2009).       
 
Most of the scholars who have written on the subject of oversight, and in particular on 
the PAC as an oversight or accountability mechanism, have done so within the 
context of national legislatures. It was in parliament, after all, that the imperative of 
oversight and the mechanism of the PAC were conceived. However, literature has 
recently also appeared in relation to sub-national legislatures and their utilisation of 
the PAC as an oversight mechanism. In Commonwealth countries with federal or 
semi-federal states or strong provincial structures, PACs exist as the primary 
financial oversight mechanism. For example, countries such as Canada, Australia, 
India and South Africa have all established PACs at sub-national level. However, 
literature about non-executive oversight in the local sphere of government is very 
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limited – it seems that oversight mechanisms similar to the PAC within local 
government only started featuring at the turn of the 21st century.  
 
Most of the earlier literature on PACs deals with the nature and form of the PAC and 
its working practices. A publication central to this discourse is The Overseers: Public 
Accounts Committees and Public Spending written by the former Clerk of the New 
Zealand House of Representatives, David McGee, in 2001. The Overseers is based 
on a survey of a 70 Commonwealth countries, and concludes that recognition must 
be given to the fact that ―Parliament‘s most important committee in the area of 
oversight and scrutiny is undoubtedly the Public Accounts Committee‖ (McGee, 
2002: IX).   
 
Since 2002, a series of publications have cast more light on the PAC as a 
phenomenon of governance. Stapenhurst – often joined by Pelizzo – has consistently 
conducted research and written about the PAC since 2004 and is currently heading a 
project of the World Bank Institute aimed at a global assessment of PACs. Institutions 
that have added their perspective to the public discourse on the PAC as a key 
legislative scrutiny and accountability mechanism include the Hansard Society and 
the Overseas Development Institute in the United Kingdom; in Canada, the Institute 
on Governance, the Canadian Council of Public Accounts Committees, the Canadian 
Comprehensive Auditing Foundation and the Parliamentary Centre. The Public 
Sector Governance and Accountability Research Centre at La Trobe University in 
Australia has also started to make useful contributions since its establishment in 
2005. Literature about local authority oversight and accountability mechanisms within 
the Commonwealth is extremely limited, however. Some research on local authority 
scrutiny and oversight committees has been carried out in the United Kingdom since 
the country‘s substantial local government reforms in 2000. In South Africa, literature 
on municipal oversight is virtually non-existent, with only one research study being 
available (see par 2.8 below).  
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2.2 What is oversight and accountability? 
 
There is general agreement that ―public oversight‖ and ―accountability‖ are about 
calling to account those entrusted with executive powers and public resources, so 
that they can give account of how they exercise of their powers and responsibilities. 
And it is the legislature, as the elected representative body of the citizenry, who must 
exercise this oversight. Yamamoto who carried out a comparative study of 88 
national legislatures in 2003, defines legislative oversight as ―the review, monitoring 
and supervision‖ of the executive government, but also of all public agencies‖ 
(2007:9). Schacter reminds us that society concedes wide powers to the executive 
authorities in the government of the day: ―to tax, to spend and to make and enforce 
policies and laws‖ for which, in return, they expect accountability (Schacter, 2000:1). 
This accountability relationship is a horizontal process of relationship (Hedger & 
Blick, 2008:2), and is made possible because of the clear separation between the 
executive and the legislative authority – a core feature of democratic systems of 
government. In fact, McGee argues that being held accountable for the exercise of 
power is a ―requirement for democracy‖ (2002:9) and Barkan, Ademolekun, Zhou, 
Laleye & Ng‘ethe (2003:1) points out that a legislature is effective only if it takes on a 
―watchdog‖ role over the executive. Brazier, Flinders & McHugh regards the scrutiny 
of executive government and holding it to account for its actions as the key function 
of a legislature (2005:33).    
 
The drafters of the South African Constitution of 1996 were clearly in agreement with 
the aforementioned authors, seeing that they included constitutional provisions that 
require legislatures to establish mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of 
state are accountable to the legislatures – mechanisms that are to maintain oversight 
of the exercise of executive authority. The Report of the Independent Panel 
Assessment of Parliament produced twelve years after the promulgation of the 
Constitution confirms that accountability and oversight remain ―crucial aspects of the 
representative role of legislatures‖ (Govender, 2008:37). 
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Murray and Nijzink illustrate the accountability arrangements provided for in the 
South African constitutional framework in the form of an ―accountability chain‖ based 
on the principle that the legislatures are responsible for executive oversight. The 
members of the executive, in turn, have to ensure oversight of those accountable to 
them, such as the heads of government departments or the boards of public entities 
(see Figure 2.1 below).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a stewardship point of view, the accountability obligation therefore originates 
from ―the practical need to delegate certain tasks to others so as to distribute delivery 
of large and complex workloads‖ (Hedger, 2008:2). The oversight process entails that 
the delegating authority expects the executive authority to explain and defend his or 
her plans, actions and decisions taken in relation to an agreed accountability period. 
Oversight can happen before, during, or at the end of an agreed accountability 
period. In the case of financial oversight, the agreed period normally is a financial 
year, i.e. the 12-month implementation period for which public sector institutions 
budget and are obliged to account. 
 
In a public sector context, the annual budget process mainly consists of four stages: 
(i) the drafting stage; (ii) the legislative approval stage; (iii) the implementation stage, 
 
   PARLIAMENT 
Figure 2.1: Chain of Accountability 
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VOTERSMENT 
 16 
and (iv) oversight stage. During the audit and oversight stage, the legislature, as 
overseeing authority, utilises all information available to it for oversight.  
 
Before the start of a financial year, legislatures mainly engage the executive authority 
on strategic plans and budgets regarding issues of prioritisation and affordability 
(Wehner, 2003:3).  To ensure that public service delivery is as efficient, effective and 
economical as possible, government departments and other institutions are required 
to formulate strategic plans and propose the allocation of resources based on 
projected costs for the implementation of those plans (National Treasury, 2007:1).  
The legislative stage entails the examination of the expenditure plans put forward by 
the executive.  Once satisfied, the legislature will approve the spending of public 
funds as presented in the documented budget by means of an Appropriation Act.  
 
In the South African context, the implementation of budgets and strategic plans is in 
the hands of the managerial branch of the executive as ―personified in the accounting 
officers (in the case of departments), accounting authorities in the case of public 
entities, and municipal managers in the case of municipalities‖ (Pauw, Woods, Van 
der Linde, Fourie & Visser, 2002:43). At the end of the accounting period, the 
accounting officer, accounting authorities and municipal managers are obliged to 
provide proper disclosure in an annual report on the manner in which the funds were 
spent. The Auditor-General (AG) as an independent attesting agency examines the 
public accounts and other information disclosed in order to provide the legislatures 
with an independent view thereon.  
 
The documents used in the accountability process therefore include strategic plans, 
budgets, in-year reports, annual reports (at year-end) and reports produced by 
independent institutions such as the AG (PCC/WBI, 2007:5). Certain oversight 
systems, such as in the United States of America, predominantly focus on policies 
and budgets before the commencement of the financial year (Schick, 1990:46), while 
the established focus of Commonwealth legislatures have always been on year-end 
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oversight of budget implementation as informed by reports of the supreme audit 
institutions (Hedger & Blick, 2008:5).  
 
Those entrusted with delegated responsibilities must be required after the fact to 
render an account of their actions. According to Hedger and Blick, the accountability 
principle potentially has two facets: Firstly there is ―calling to account‖ – being 
required to explain action, or inaction, and the reasons for this, and, secondly, 
―holding to account‖, which entails being penalised or required to institute corrective 
actions (2008:2).  According to a representation of the accountability cycle developed 
by the Institute on Governance in Canada, the oversight and accountability process 
has at least three stages (Schacter, 2000:3): (i) the information; (ii) the action; and 
(iii) the response stage. During the information stage, the overseeing authority 
normally attempts to obtain the best possible accountability information. Information 
is obtained directly from the accountable executive institution, or from another source 
such as an independent assurance agency, for example an Auditor-General. The aim 
of the second stage, the action stage, is to ―produce demands upon the political 
executive‖ to clarify and account for the actions they have taken. However, the 
success of this stage is dependent on the ability of the overseer to process the 
information, and on the overseer‘s commitment to use the processed information as 
the foundation for the demands to be placed on the accountable institution. The 
success of the third stage, the response stage, is dependent on the appropriateness 
of the accountable institution‘s responses and how quickly it responds (see Figure 
2.2 on page 18). 
 
However, it is important to note that the cycle of accountability does not occur in 
isolation – political, social and economic factors provide a context that will impact on 
the effectiveness of the accountability process (Schacter, 2007:4). Hedger and Blick 
seem to be in agreement, as they point out that a fully functioning accountability 
mechanism such as a PAC ―can be rendered ineffective if the surrounding  
governance environment is not conducive and supportive‖ (2008:4). 
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Information – obtain relevant, 
accurate & timely information
Response – obtain timely 
and appropriate response
Action – evaluate / analyse 
information, and make demands
Figure 2:2
Schacter’s Accountability Cycle 
Source: Schacter, 2000: 3
Context
 
 
A pertinent illustration of the principles underlining the model of the accountability 
process illustrated in Figure 2.2 (above) relates to the information improvements 
brought about in South Africa by reforms to the statutory framework relating to 
financial and non-financial performance reporting. A new statutory framework in the 
form of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) introduced best practice 
requirements as far as the quality and timeliness of accountability information is 
concerned. At the time when the PFMA was promulgated in 1999, the legislatures in 
South Africa in most cases received financial statements and audit reports thereon 
more than 12 months after the end of the financial years. The detail and quality of the 
information then contained in the accounts were inadequate, and virtually no 
information was available with regard to service delivery performance, the non-
financial accountability information. Today, 94% out of a total of 505 sets of accounts 
of national and provincial departments and public entities are tabled within seven 
months of the end of the financial year in an annual report containing increasingly 
improved information on service delivery performance (AG, 2009).  As far as the 
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action stage is concerned – Stage 2 of the accountability cycle in Schacter‘s model – 
progress in South Africa, however, is not as successful.  It was only in 2008 that the 
National Assembly in South Africa adopted a framework for improved oversight. The 
Oversight and Accountability Model includes as it is called, is aimed at improving the 
capacity to analyse and process accountability information regularly provided to the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces by national government 
departments and public entities. None of the provincial legislatures have, however, 
adopted similar models to ensure effective evaluation accountability information. As 
far as the response stage – the third stage of Schacter‘s accountability cycle – is 
concerned, Parliament‘s oversight model also contains measures aimed at 
generating more responsiveness from the executive authorities in response to the 
concerns of the legislature. Most of the measures proposed in Parliament‘s Oversight 
Model, however, are yet to be implemented. 
 
2.3 Are oversight and accountability important? 
 
If democracy is the overall objective of a system of government, then oversight and 
accountability is important.  At the final sitting of the first democratically elected 
Parliament, on 26 March 1999, the former president of the Republic of South Africa, 
Nelson Mandela, pointed out that –   
 
It is in the legislatures that the instruments have been fashioned to create a 
better life for all. It is here that oversight of government has been exercised. It 
is here that our society in all its formations has had an opportunity to influence 
policy and its implementation.  
(Sourced from the Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament, 2008) 
 
Oversight and accountability are terms that have emerged as universal attributes of 
good governance. According to the Secretary-General of the Inter-parliamentary 
Union, there can be no democratic system of government without transparency and 
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accountability (Yamamoto, 2007:6). International lending and donor organisations 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have started to 
consider oversight and accountability as key elements that they expect to be present 
in any system of government. ―As commonly understood, the word (accountability) 
carries a simple meaning: those with power must answer to those they serve — the 
people. So defined, accountability is a fundamental concept in ethics, rule of law and 
democracy and few today would attempt to dispute the concept in principle‖ 
(PCC/WBI, 2001: 5). 
 
Legislatures provide the legal and regulatory framework within which the executive 
authorities and their officials operate, and large amounts of public funds are 
entrusted to the executive authorities on an annual basis for the execution of the 
public policies that they had persuaded the legislature to endorse. According to 
McEldowney (2008:1), oversight by the legislature is the recognised means whereby 
the executive can be held to account; in addition, ―the ability of the elected house to 
hold government to account is axiomatic to the health of the political life of the state‖. 
Loney (20081) can therefore rightly state that accountability is increasingly being 
regarded as ―the best mechanism for ensuring that executive government operates in 
the best interests of its citizens‖. However, oversight is not an end in itself. For 
oversight to have significance, it has to be guided by the nation‘s interests and those 
of all of its citizens. In exercising their oversight mandate, the overseers – the 
members of the legislatures – must therefore ―clearly understand their role and 
authority vis-à-vis the Executive, and must be willing to assert this authority to 
improve service delivery and the quality of governance‖ (Govender, 2008: 35). 
 
Legislative oversight takes place in two ways mainly: first when policies and plans are 
put forward for which public funds are required, also referred to as ex ante oversight; 
and after these plans have been implemented, with public funds having been spent in 
order to implement them, year-end or ex post oversight take place (Stapenhurst, 
Sahgal, Woodley & Pelizzo, 2005:2).    
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A recommendation made by the AG of British Columbia in Canada at the end of his 
term of office points to the importance of oversight and he encourages legislators to 
―strongly encourage and champion the principle that the public has the right to know 
how government fulfils the responsibilities entrusted to government by the public — 
as government touches virtually every aspect of a person‘s life‖ (OAG BC, 2006:18). 
 
2.4 Committees as primary mechanisms of oversight 
 
A committee is a functional extension of a legislature‘s plenary structure or chamber, 
and is found in legislatures across the world. Committees have the obligation to keep 
their parent chamber informed of the outcomes of the work they do on its behalf, and 
this is normally done in the form of reports which generally contain preliminary 
findings and recommendations in relation to the matters considered.  
 
Committees nowadays carry out a significant part of the legislature‘s work 
(Yamamoto, 2007:15). In 2001, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst carried out a study involving 
83 countries on the various oversight mechanisms being used by their legislatures. 
The mechanisms included commissions of inquiry; questions to members of the 
executive authority; interpellations; hearings in plenary sessions of the legislature; 
and committee hearings. Ninety-five per cent of the respondent legislatures identified 
committee hearings as a key oversight mechanism (2004:10).  
 
According to Longley and Davidson, the committees of the legislatures are well 
suited to effective oversight. They point out that ―a major – perhaps even the central 
– factor explaining the growing use of committees in parliamentary democracies‖ is 
the legislature‘s desire to improve their oversight ability (1998:4). Organising 
legislatures into committees seems to serve the legislature‘s need for more efficient 
and informed oversight, and although they are ―rarely mandated by constitution, yet 
they almost invariably exist‖ (Strøm, 1998:24).     
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The main function of committees is to obtain detailed perspectives on the matters 
before the legislature in order to be in a position to advise the legislature. A 
committee system is also an effective mechanism to divide the resources available to 
the legislature, thereby providing efficient processing of the workload. As committee 
members have, or are able to, develop specialised skills, the quality of the work done 
by committees is potentially of a higher standard than larger structures. A 
committee‘s composition is normally representative of all of the political parties in the 
legislature (Yamamoto, 2007:16) and this is also the case in the RSA. As committees 
can develop work programmes based on the need that exists at any particular time, 
committees have the ability to cope with detailed reports or submissions (Murray & 
Nijzink, 2002:91). Committees have the flexibility to meet whenever and wherever 
necessary, i.e. outside of the legislature‘s precinct. In most democracies, the 
meetings of committees in the legislatures are open to the public.  Committees are 
also able to process higher volumes of work than the legislature can manage in 
plenary sessions, and committees can co-operate with each other as, and when, 
required.  However, it is important that the outputs of the committees – their reports 
containing their Preliminary findings and recommendations – be given the necessary 
exposure in the plenary sessions, and that they receive the endorsement of the 
legislature.  Committees primarily are instruments of specialisation, and there seems 
to be agreement that they are effective in acquiring information. They provide their 
members with a definite advantage over non-committee members because of the 
superior information at their disposal, which enables their members to contribute 
greatly to informed discussion in plenary debates (Yamamoto, 2007:16).  
 
As the people‘s assemblies with the function to oversee, legislatures can make a 
difference only if they have the capability to obtain information and expertise 
independent of the government (Strøm, 1998:53). After all, argue Michels and Meijer, 
democratic accountability ―can only thrive if the party to whom account is rendered 
has sufficient information at [its] disposal [so] as to be able to form a judgement‖ 
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(2008:170).  In most countries, legislatures have therefore established independent 
institutions that can provide the legislature with information on which they can rely. 
Such ―watchdog‖ organisations include supreme audit institutions, anti-corruption 
commissions, and ombudsmen (Hedger & Blick, 2008:12).   
 
2.5 The Auditor-General and oversight 
  
The supreme audit institution – in Commonwealth countries known as the Auditor-
General – is the primary assurance agency in systems of government and the main 
source of information as far as public accounts committees are concerned (McGee, 
2002:99). The main purpose of a supreme audit institution is to examine the 
management of public funds by the government of the day, as well as the quality and 
credibility of information concerning financial accountability regarding funds that 
government provides to the legislature.  
 
Figure 2.3:
Legislatures & the public sector financial cycle
Policy 
Development
Strategic and 
operational planning
Budgeting
Implementation
End-year Reporting
Audit
Legislature
Source: APAC, adopted from a diagram by AFReC (Pty) Ltd.  
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In South Africa, the AGSA has been established as an independent institution in 
support of democracy. The AGSA has to audit and report to the national and 
provincial legislatures and municipal councils without fear, favour or prejudice. In 
Figure 2.3 on page 23 the position of the AGSA as an assurance agency is illustrated 
as the agency attesting to the reliability of the information concerning accountability 
that is disclosed to the legislature at the end of the financial year. 
 
Traditionally, AGs only audited financial information, but in the case of South Africa 
and other progressive audit offices in the Commonwealth, the AGSA now also audits 
the non-financial performance information (predetermined objectives), thereby 
providing the legislature with more attested information than before.  
 
2.6 What is a Public Accounts Committee? 
 
In a parliamentary democracy it is a fundamental and, in many cases, a 
constitutionally documented principle that the legislature has ultimate authority over 
the public funds. This authority is mainly exercised by authorising the raising of public 
revenue, as well as the appropriation thereof. The executive ―should have no income 
which is not granted to Parliament or otherwise sanctioned by Parliament‖ and ―have 
no expenditures except those approved by Parliament, in ways approved by 
Parliament‖ (CCPAC, 1989:12).  
 
In the case of the PAC, the indisputable focus of its oversight is public funds and the 
control or protection of the ―public purse‖ (PCC/WBI, 2007:7). The focus of the PAC 
is on the manner in which funds have been used in the implementation of agreed 
policy objectives (Hedger & Blick, 2008:5). The PAC draws on historical information 
relating to all aspects of the management of public funds and other resources as it is 
captured in the accounts of the State. The PAC concerns itself with administrative 
oversight and not policy oversight (Longley & Davidson, 1998:6), and does not 
investigate the spending activities of the public sector only, but also other activities 
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that impact on the public coffers, such as contingent liabilities or decisions that have 
a long-term impact on public assets (Hedger & Blick, 2008:6).  
 
The essence of PAC oversight is that, at the end of any particular financial year, and 
with independent perspectives provided by the Auditor-General, the said committee 
requires explanations from the spending authority about their expenditure and the 
extent to which spending objectives were achieved or not achieved. 
(Wehner, 2003:3; McEldowney, 2008:4). The historical perspective acquired by the 
PAC provides the opportunity for past mistakes to provide lessons for the future 
(McEldowney, 2008:8). 
 
The PAC traditionally seeks assurance that funds are spent with regularity and in line 
with the purposes for which it was initially approved by the legislature. The modern 
PAC, however, will also seek assurance that funds are spent economically, efficiently 
and effectively (Wehner, 2003:3). There are isolated instances where the PAC also 
oversees the development of budget policies and budget planning, but it is unlikely 
that this will become the norm (Hedger & Blick, 2008:9). However, if the PAC process 
is effective, its recommendations can also inform future budgets, creating continuous 
improvements in public spending (Wehner, 2003:3). 
 
Most of the 170 legislatures in the Commonwealth have established PACs to oversee 
the spending of public funds (McGee, 2002:IX). The first legislature to entrench the 
principle of oversight of public funds was the House of Commons in 1861 when it 
established a ―Committee on Public Accounts‖ as a key part of Parliament‘s control 
over public spending (McEldowney, 2008:3). The PAC model has achieved such 
success that Wehner (2003:2) argues that ―the protracted popularity and success of 
this institutional export indicate the importance of such a committee as the legislative 
apex for financial scrutiny in the Westminster tradition of parliamentary democracy‖. 
He also points out that the importance of parliamentary oversight of audit reports ―is 
being promoted by international organisations as a crucial mechanism to facilitate 
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transparency in government financial operations‖. The popularity of the PAC can be 
seen from the extent to which all of the legislatures in four Commonwealth countries 
with federal or semi-federal systems at national and sub-national levels have 
established PACs (see Table 2.1 below). 
 
 
TABLE 2.1: 
National and sub-national Commonwealth PACs  
Countries  Number of 
Jurisdictions 
Number of established 
PACs 
Australia 8 8 
India 28 28 
Canada 14 14 
South Africa 10 10 
    
   Source: Own research  
 
 
Eighty-five per cent of PACs in the commonwealth rely primarily on the Auditor-
General‘s report for oversight (McGee, 2002:99), although a number of PACs now 
also carry out self-initiated inquiries. For example, in Australia and New Zealand 90% 
of the PACs reported self-initiated inquiries (KPMG, 2006:28).  
 
The PAC normally supplements the perspective provided by the AG by summoning 
senior public officials to its hearings in order to obtain first-hand information. In 
certain countries it is an established convention for the PAC to engage the political 
head of the department or agency concerned (see Table 2.2 below). What is 
important, however, is that the PAC is formally given the power to summon any 
person that may be necessary for a proper enquiry, and to be able to obtain any 
documentary evidence that it may require.  
 
The PAC has a strong tradition of non-partisanship and unanimous decision-making 
as decisions and reports are usually endorsed by all the members of the committee. 
The non-partisan tradition is supported by the convention that an opposition member 
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should chair the PAC (McEldowney, 2008:4). The arrangement regarding the 
leadership of the committee is important given the influence the chairperson has over 
the direction of the committee‘s examinations and the work programmes. Such an 
arrangement is also regarded as having the potential to promote greater 
independence, actual and perceived (Hedger & Blick, 2008:17). In 67% of 
Commonwealth countries, the chair-persons of the PAC are opposition members 
(McGee, 2002:97). 
  
Table 2.2:  
Persons normally summonsed as witnesses in Commonwealth Countries 
 
 Yes No 
Ministers  31% 69% 
Departmental officials 97% 3% 
AG  79% 21% 
Interest groups/civil society bodies 29% 71% 
        
Source: McGee, 2002:98 
 
 
Meetings of the PAC predominantly take place in public as this adds to the ability of 
the PAC to bring pressure to bear on those whom they oversee, and the media is an 
important partner in this process. The House of Commons in the United Kingdom 
advises that a transparent process ensures that those responsible for financial 
decisions are certain that they will be examined thoroughly for possible 
mismanagement (HoC, 2008:7). It is surprising, therefore, that only 55% of PACs in 
the Commonwealth carry out their business in public (McGee, 2002:99).  
 
PACs have devised different methods to capacitate themselves, including ensuring 
that the said committee has adequate secretariat, research and professional support. 
Many PACs arrange for pre-hearing briefings by the AG, or rely on the AG as an 
expert witness during hearings. Some PACs, when carrying out specific enquiries, 
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receive written evidence from relevant subject matter experts (Hedger & Blick, 
2008:40).   
 
Once the PAC has obtained adequate information to arrive at well-informed 
preliminary findings and conclusions, it prepares a report to be submitted to the 
parent chamber. The challenge is for the committee to produce its reports in a timely 
manner, and to get it published. In 87% of the countries of the Commonwealth, the 
reports of the PAC are available to the public and the media (McGee, 2002:98).  It is 
also important to obtain the endorsement of the legislature so that the PAC 
recommendations can be furnished to the relevant executive authority for action to be 
taken in response to the PAC recommendations. It is desirable that the executive 
authority is formally required to respond to the committee‘s recommendations and 
does so within a prescribed period (McEldowney, 2008:12). The responsiveness of 
the executive to the committee recommendations is an indicator of how seriously the 
committee is being taken and everything possible should be done to establish work 
practices that would assist in entrenching such responsiveness as part and parcel of 
the financial governance environment within the public service (Hedger & Blick, 2008: 
5; 42).  
 
2.7 Can PAC practices be standardised? 
 
The key features of the PAC have been described and analysed quite extensively by 
a number of organisations and authors over the last two decades. Pioneers in this 
regard were the members of the Canadian Council of Public Accounts Committees 
(CCPAC). The CCPAC is an organisation made up of the 14 public accounts 
committees in Canada‘s national and provincial legislatures. In 1991, CCPAC carried 
out an implementation comparison of over 50 features of PACs aimed at improved 
accountability through PAC practices (CCPAC, 1991). The survey was based on a 
guideline for PACs issued by CCPAC in 1988, and covered areas such as the PAC‘s 
mandate and terms of reference; the powers of a PAC; the composition of 
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committees and operating style; its relationship with the AG, the executive, and the 
media; and the PAC‘s resource requirements. The majority of these practices are still 
recognized today as key to an effective PAC. 
 
Then, in 2001, a study group of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 
produced a report on practices of PACs in 70 of the Commonwealth‘s member 
countries. The report was edited and published under the title of ―The Overseers‖ in 
2002 by a former Clerk of the New Zealand Parliament (McGee, 2002). The 
watershed McGee report presented a number of conclusions with recommendations 
on what was regarded as the key requirements for effective PACs. The report also 
made recommendations about the independence of the AG as the principal institution 
supporting the work of the PAC (2002: 6-8 and 11).  
 
The McGee report was followed in 2005 by an investigation by a number of 
researchers led by a senior public sector management specialist of the World Bank 
Institute (WBI), a division of the World Bank established to support individual, 
organisational, and institutional capacity among developing countries. This body 
analysed data from 51 Commonwealth legislatures collected by the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association (CPA) in 2001. The main objective of the WBI analysis 
was ―to deepen‖ McGee‘s 2002 analysis.  
 
The WBI concluded that a PAC was more successful when it –  
 
 concentrated on public sector financial activities instead of policies; 
 was given the power to investigate all past and present public sector 
expenditure; 
 had the authority to follow up on the actions taken by government in response 
to the PAC‘s recommendations; and  
 had a good working relationship with the AG (Stapenhurst, Sahgal, Woodley, 
and Pelizzo, 2005).  
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This analysis also identified a number of key institutional success factors for PACs 
which were consolidated into a list of 17 characteristics of an ‗ideal‘ PAC (see Table 
2.3 below). 
 
Table 2.3:   
 
The ‘ideal’ PAC   
 
 
1 The Committee is small; committees seem to work well with 5-11 members, none of 
whom should be government Ministers; 
2 Senior opposition figures are associated with the PAC’s work, and probably chair the 
Committee; 
3 The Chair is a senior parliamentarian, who is fair-minded and respected by 
parliament; 
4 The Committee is appointed for the full term of the parliament; 
5 The Committee is adequately resourced, with an experienced clerk and a competent 
researcher(s); 
6 There is clarity on the Committee’s role and responsibilities; 
7 The Committee meets frequently and regularly; 
8 Hearings are open to the public; a full verbatim transcript and summary minutes are 
quickly available for public distribution; 
9 A steering committee plans the Committee’s work in advance and prepares an 
agenda for each meeting to the full Committee; 
10 The typical witness is a senior public servant (the ‘accounting officer’) accompanied 
by the officials who have a detailed understanding of the issues under examination; 
11 The Auditor’s Report is automatically referred to the Committee and the Auditor 
meets with the Committee to go over the highlights of the report; 
12 In addition to issues raised by the Auditor, the Committee occasionally decides to 
investigate other matters; 
13 The Committee strives for consensus in its reports; 
14 The Committee issues formal substantive reports to parliament, at least annually; 
15 The Committee has an established procedure with the government for following up 
recommendations and is informed about what, if any, action has been taken; 
16 In all its deliberations, the Committee uses the Auditor-General as an expert advisor; 
17 Parliaments hold an annual debate on the work of the Committee. 
 
Source: Stapenhurst, et al., 2005: 25 
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In 2006 the government advisory services of KPMG in Australia and New Zealand, 
on behalf of the Public Sector Governance and Accountability Research Centre at La 
Trobe University, published a study of the structures, responsibilities and working 
practices adopted by PACs across Australia and New Zealand as the basis for 
effective public sector financial accountability and governance (KPMG, 2006). The 
study identified a range of practices and working methods that most of the PACs in 
Australasia had developed and that can be regarded as better practices for any PAC. 
 
This study was followed in 2007 by a similar survey among the ten PACs in the 
national and provincial spheres of government in South Africa (APAC, 2007), and by 
another comparable survey in 2009 of the PACs of nine countries in Southern Africa 
(Southern Africa Development Community Organisation of Public Accounts 
Committees) (SADCOPAC, 2009)).  These studies indicated differences in 
composition, terms of reference and methods of work based on region-specific 
factors and challenges. However, there were also numerous corresponding features 
that provided useful insight into the generally accepted PAC practices in these parts 
of the world and revealed substantial alignment with international practices identified 
in the earlier literature.  
 
As there seemed to be a high congruence between a high number of these practices, 
the researcher decided to compare the practices documented by the key authors and 
organisations since the Canadian jurisdictional survey of 1991. The result of this 
comparison was a list of 20 practices and attributes of PACs that at least three out of 
five eminent authors agreed were of decisive importance for an effective functioning 
PAC to comply with. For the purposes of the subject of this research, these practices 
provided a most useful checklist of generally accepted PAC practices that could be 
used as a ‘standard‘ against which to measure any established PAC (see Table 2.4 
on page 32).  
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There are a number of other practices, however, that have not been included in the 
list of 20 generally accepted practices referred to above, although some authors have 
advocated that these factors were critical. Loney, for example, proposes that PACs 
need to have mechanisms for self-evaluation (Loney, 2008), and Hedger and Blick 
suggest that PAC members should operate in terms of quasi-legal or constitutional 
principles of conduct (2008:40). These practices must still prove to be recognised by 
more than just one well-known author on the subject of PACS, before it can be 
regarded as generally accepted practice. The future will judge whether they become 
sufficiently entrenched to be regarded as the norm.  
 
Table 2.4: 
 
Generally accepted PAC practices  
 
1 The PAC is established by legislation or standing rules 
2 The PAC mandate is clear (i.e. ex post examination of public sector finances)  
3 A written description of the PAC mandate and terms of reference exists  
4 The focus of the PAC is on policy implementation and not policy itself  
5 
 
The PAC has power to compel any person to appear before it, or to have access 
to any relevant information  
6 The PAC has powers to initiate own investigations  
7 The PAC may make recommendations to the Executive via the House 
8 Membership is limited to non-executive members  
9 It is preferable for the chairman to be from the opposition  
10 The committee operates in a non-partisan manner; always strives for consensus 
11 Public hearings are the norm, giving access to the general public and the media 
12 Frequent or regular meetings take place  
13 Collaboration with other oversight committees is beneficial 
14 PAC reports are always published and made public 
15 Primary source documents are reports of the Auditor-General 
16 Has access to adequate resources – secretarial, research and audit 
17 Members are exposed to specialised training/professional development 
18 Debating on the PAC report takes place in the legislature (plenary) 
19 Executive authority is required to respond to PAC recommendations  
20 
 
Records of proceedings of the committee are kept 
 
*Sources used for comparative analysis: 
1.
 CCPAC, 1991;  
2. 
CPA, 2002;  
3. 
Stapenhurst et al, 2005               
4. 
KPMG, 2006;  and  
5.
 Hedger & Blick, 2008 
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2.8 What about PACs in the municipal sphere?  
 
As set out above, there is ample evidence of the PAC having been accepted by 
national and sub-national legislatures all over the world as a vital oversight 
mechanism.  The question is whether there is similar recognition of this oversight 
mechanism at local government level, but there is not much literature available to 
assist in answering this question.  
 
Local governments in many parts of the Commonwealth have not always made a 
clear distinction between the executive council members and the non-executive 
members as the elected representatives in the municipality responsible for 
overseeing the actions of the executive. This represents ―a major difference with the 
federal (national) and provincial (sub-national) levels where Cabinet represents the 
Executive Branch of government and is clearly accountable for the government 
actions‖ (Shah, 2007:8). There is as much reason at local government level as at 
other levels of government to have mechanisms to ensure that execution is 
consistent with the approved budget. Given the frustration with local public services 
in South Africa and in many other parts of the world, there is certainly also need to 
ensure that local government ―is perceived to have robust accountability 
arrangements and values‖ (IoG, 2006: 2). Town councils have an obligation to 
satisfactorily discharge their responsibilities to ensure ―the effective financial 
stewardship of the public money and assets entrusted to it‖ (Audit Commission, 2002: 
3).   
 
On the basis of available literature, the United Kingdom (UK) seems to be leading the 
way as far as non-executive oversight of executive local government in the 
Commonwealth is concerned. At the turn of the 21st century, local government 
reforms in the UK established the requirement of scrutiny committees within all local 
authorities. Since the Local Government Act of 2000, the roles and powers within the 
local authorities have been clearly separated, specifically the difference in roles 
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between the Mayor, who has an executive decision-making role and the council 
assembly whose function is to scrutinise. (Note: In the UK the oversight function is 
referred to as the scrutiny function.)  The Act also requires the appointment of one or 
more overview and scrutiny committees whose membership may not include any 
member of the local authority‘s executive. This development is regarded as 
―potentially the most exciting and powerful element of the entire local government 
modernisation process, leading to active community leadership, and good 
governance‖ (Snape, 2002:7). The Audit Commission (AC), as the UK external audit 
institution for local authorities, points out that ―the executive/scrutiny split separates 
out previously integrated processes‖, making improved governance possible (AC, 
2002:11). In terms of these arrangements ―executives are empowered, but they will 
need to provide a more detailed account than ever before of the use of that power 
and the council‘s resources‖ and the new overview and scrutiny function exists as ―a 
means of holding the council‘s executive to account for the power it wields‖ (AC, 
2002: 6, 7). However, Snape warns that for councillors to ―[hold] fellow members to 
account in a transparent and rigorous manner is simply not part of the traditional 
member behaviour and culture‖ and therefore oversight and scrutiny can only 
succeed ―if scrutiny councillors drive the process and provide genuine leadership‖ 
(2002: 9 and 111). Some of the other common pitfalls identified in the UK are listed in 
Table 2.5: 
 
Table 2.5:   
Common pitfalls faced by UK local authority scrutiny committees 
 
 
 Conflicting definitions of important terms such as overview and 
scrutiny  
 Under-resourcing the function  
 
 Unrealistic and unmanageable work programmes, and poor 
management of scrutiny processes 
 Lack of coordination of scrutiny committee work, and weak links to 
other new structures 
 
Source: Snape, 2002:14 
 
          
             
 35 
Concern is also expressed that, unless the scrutiny committees in the UK have the 
necessary dedicated officer support, they are unlikely to succeed. Secretariat support 
is therefore considered by many to be ―the most controversial and contentious 
aspects of the new political management arrangements‖ and ―effective direct officer 
support and management of scrutiny processes‖ is regarded as one of the conditions 
for effective scrutiny (Snape, 2002:79 and 111).  
The Audit Commission furthermore points out that councils have single staff 
establishments, and that staff will be expected to serve both sides of the 
scrutiny/executive split. This may lead to uncritical and unhelpful support staff as far 
as scrutiny is concerned, if they are not dedicated to the scrutiny committee (AC, 
2002:12).  
The following are some of the other conditions identified by Snape for effective local 
government oversight and scrutiny:  
 
 A responsive executive willing to listen to and be influenced by the scrutiny 
committee, and making use of the power of influence ; 
 Genuine non-partisan working, with the easing of party control being perceived as 
a critical success factor; 
 Supportive senior officer culture – a factor just as important as a responsive 
executive, as senior officers are able to “smother the effectiveness of overview 
and scrutiny”;    
 A high level of awareness and understanding of oversight and scrutiny by internal 
and external stakeholders – education of staff and non-scrutiny members, as well 
as the public and the media is therefore important (Snape, 2002:11-112).   
 
The need to train oversight councillors was also pointed out by the Canadian Institute 
on Governance, who noted the disparity in what was done for councillors in terms of 
training against ―the growing emphasis in the private sector on the orientation and 
grooming of corporate directors‖. (IoG, 2006:5) 
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2.9 MPACs in South Africa  
 
In relation to South African local government, Van der Walt claims that there is 
statutory differentiation between the roles and responsibilities of executive councillors 
and officials, seeing that the executive mayor or executive committee is responsible 
for policy outcomes, while the municipal manager and senior managers are 
responsible for implementation and outputs. He further claims that ―[n]on-executive 
councillors are expected to hold both the executive mayor or executive committee 
and the senior managers accountable on the basis of quarterly and annual reports‖ 
(2007:62). However, he does not explain the basis on which he makes this claim, and 
the statutory framework regarding executive versus non-executive roles is, in fact, 
quite vague.  The RSA Constitution does not provide the same level of clarity 
regarding non-executive oversight as it does in relation to the national and provincial 
spheres of government – see Chapter 3 below.  Although a whole series of local 
government Acts and regulations were passed following the 1998 White Paper on 
Local Government, little guidance is available in South Africa regarding non-
executive municipal oversight.  
 
It is not surprising, then, that a 2008 study, by the Gauteng Local Government 
Department (GLG), of seven MPACs established in Gauteng in 2007 found that there 
was a lack of clarity in relation to a number of aspects of MPAC operations (see 
Table 2.6).  
 
Table 2.6:  
Challenges related to clarity at MPACs in Gauteng, South Africa 
 No standard method of establishing an MPAC 
 Divergent views among stakeholders regarding the role of an MPAC 
 A lack of clarity regarding the MPAC’s relationship with municipal 
committees such as the audit committee and portfolio committees 
 MPAC support staff lack a clear understanding of the MPAC’s role 
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and responsibilities 
 Lack of clarity regarding MPAC’s role with regard to daily 
operational matters owing to the lack of a policy framework 
 The general reason provided for the seven MPACs not yet 
operating at the expected level, was a lack of clarity regarding their 
function and a lack of support from their respective municipalities 
 
Source: GLG, 2008:18-27  
     
2.10 Conclusion  
 
The literature has shown that there are identifiable PAC practices that have proven 
over the years to be important for this oversight mechanism to carry out its financial 
scrutiny work successfully. These practices are aimed at, inter alia, ensuring that:    
 
 There is clarity regarding the role, functions and powers of the PAC; 
 The PAC exercises it powers without political interference, whether internal or 
external; 
 Independently verified and timely information is available to the committee; 
 Information is processed efficiently by members who have had the necessary 
training and who are assisted by competent internal and external resources; 
 The PAC operates often and with transparency; and  
 Its outputs are noted and responded to. 
 
Despite the differences and complexities of various government systems, and despite 
the numerous challenges that PACs are faced with, this form of oversight committee 
has much to offer legislatures at any level of government. In looking at the available 
literature on PACs throughout the world, there are no reasons why the PAC cannot 
be expanded to the local government sphere with the same success as in the 
expansion of its application to the provincial sphere in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Since 1994, a concerted effort has been made to provide South Africa with a 
legislative framework that is aligned to the values and principles enshrined in its 
Constitution. Accordingly, worthy progress has been made in putting in place a 
legislative framework that enables good government for the public sector – in 
providing effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government in the interest 
of the South African public. Organs of state, as defined in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996 (the Constitution), are required not only to 
be efficient and effective in serving the South African public, but to do so in a 
transparent, open and accountable manner.  
 
The renewal of the legislative landscape included numerous amendments to existing 
legislation, as well as the innovation of new statutes in order to modernise, amongst 
others, the budget and financial management systems and practices.  There have 
also been refinements to the legislative frameworks that empower the South African 
legislatures to carry out their important work of continuously and critically assessing 
the way in which the executive government performs in their pursuit of advancing and 
consolidating democracy and serving the public in all three spheres of government.  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the legislative framework within which oversight 
and accountability mechanisms, such as public accounts committees in South Africa, 
have to function. The overview begins with the supreme law of South Africa, the 
Constitution, and from there discusses a number of statutes in the three spheres of 
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government which are relevant to oversight and accountability in respect of local 
government.  
 
3.2 The RSA Constitution  
 
The RSA Constitution is very clear about the importance of accountability and good 
governance. In the first chapter, in the founding provisions in section 1(d), the RSA 
Constitution establishes ―accountability, responsiveness and openness‖ as founding 
values. In terms of section 41(1)(c), the said Constitution requires that all spheres of 
government, and all organs of state within each sphere, provide effective, 
transparent, accountable and coherent government for the RSA as a whole. The 
principles of accountability and transparency are therefore established at the highest 
statutory level.  
 
The RSA Constitution establishes Parliament and the provincial legislatures as the 
legislative authorities within the national and provincial spheres of government, and 
the municipal council as the legislative authority within the municipal sphere in 
section 43. In sections 55 and 114, legislatures in the national and provincial spheres 
of government are given the responsibility of having to provide mechanisms to 
ensure that all executive organs of state are accountable to the Constitution. It also 
obliges the legislatures to maintain oversight of the exercise of executive authority. 
 
When carrying out the duties of oversight, sections 56 and 115 of the RSA 
Constitution provide the national and provincial legislatures and any of its committees 
with power to summon any person to appear before it to give evidence; to produce 
documents; or to report to the legislature or any of its committees. 
 
As is the case in most democracies, the RSA Constitution establishes the legislatures 
as the source of executive power. Sections 86 and 128 deal with the election of the 
President and the premiers by the national assembly and provincial legislatures, 
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respectively. Sections 89 and 130 provide for the removal of such persons by the 
same authorities.  Sections 92 and 133 set out the obligations regarding 
accountability of the national cabinet and the provincial executive councils – their 
members are individually and collectively accountable to the legislatures. Similar 
powers and obligations are not included in Chapter 7: Local government. The 
resultant lack of certainty as far as local government oversight powers will be 
explained later in this chapter. 
 
Section 139 of the RSA Constitution provides for provincial supervision of local 
government that may, in certain cases, lead to intervention by the province in the 
affairs of a municipality, as follows: When a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an 
executive obligation in terms of legislation, the relevant provincial executive may 
intervene to ensure fulfilment of such obligation. A certain process must be followed, 
including the issuing of a directive to the relevant council, describing the extent of the 
failure to fulfil its obligations and stating any steps required to meet such obligations. 
The national government also becomes involved in such interventions, as the 
intervention by the provincial executive must end unless it is approved by the national 
cabinet member responsible for local government affairs within 14 days of the 
intervention.  Both the provincial legislature and the National Council of Provinces 
(NCOP) in Parliament must be notified and it is therefore possible for them to also 
become involved – in fact, the intervention must end unless it is approved by the 
NCOP within 30 days of its first sitting after the intervention began. The NCOP is also 
expected to review the intervention regularly and to make appropriate 
recommendations to the provincial executive.  
 
As far as transparency and public access to the legislative and oversight processes 
of councils are concerned, sections 59 and 118 of the RSA Constitution require of the 
legislatures to conduct their business in an open manner, and hold their meetings 
and those of their committees in public.  
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As previously mentioned, Parliament and provincial legislatures have ultimate 
authority over public funds. Sections 213 and 226 only permit the withdrawal of 
money from the national or provincial revenue funds in terms of an Act of Parliament 
or an Act of a provincial legislature. There is a National Revenue Fund into which all 
money received by the national government must be paid, except money reasonably 
excluded by an Act of Parliament or the provincial legislature. Money may be 
withdrawn from the national or provincial revenue funds only in terms of an 
appropriation by an Act of Parliament or the provincial legislature, or as a direct 
charge against the these funds when it is provided for in the RSA Constitution or an 
Act of these legislatures. A province‘s equitable share of revenue raised nationally is 
a direct charge against the National Revenue Fund. 
 
However, it is incumbent upon these legislatures to then oversee the use of the 
money withdrawn by determining whether the funds were spent for the purposes 
intended, and whether it was done in a regular manner in terms of the applicable 
financial management frameworks such as sections 213 and 226 of the RSA 
Constitution relating to the National Revenue Fund, and the PFMA. 
 
Lastly, section 195 of the RSA Constitution sets out the basic values and principles 
governing public administration, including requiring that a high standard of 
professional ethics must be promoted and maintained; efficient, economic and 
effective use of resources must be promoted; and public administration must be 
accountable. 
 
3.3 Powers, Privileges, Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures 
Act  
 
The Powers, Privileges, Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act, 
No. 4 of 2004 (PPIPPL), expands on the powers that the RSA Constitution gives to 
committees of legislatures. Chapter 5 of the PPIPPL provides for the summonsing of 
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witnesses; the examination of witnesses; and offences relating to witnesses. For 
example, a person who has been summonsed and who fails to attend at the time and 
place specified in the summons, or who fails fully and satisfactorily to answer all 
questions lawfully put to him or her, or fails to produce any document in his or her 
possession or custody or under his or her control, which he or she has been required 
to produce, commits an offence. Such a person is then liable to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or to both the fine and the 
imprisonment. 
 
This provision also applies to a person who threatens or obstructs another person in 
respect of evidence to be given before a House or committee. However, in such a 
case a penalty for a period of up to two years imprisonment is possible.    
 
Section 6(3) further provides that evidence given under oath or affirmation by a 
person before a House or committee may not be used against that person in any 
court or place outside Parliament, except in criminal proceedings.  
 
The aforementioned provisions are important because they empower committees of 
the legislatures to carry out informed and unhindered oversight, and also provide 
protection to witnesses who may be afraid of giving incriminating evidence.  
However, these powers and privileges do not apply to municipal councils or their 
committees, resulting in a lack of clarity regarding the roles, powers and functions in 
relation to municipal council oversight.    
 
3.4 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act  
 
The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, No. 117 of 1998 (MStr) provides for 
the establishment of various categories of municipalities in accordance with and for 
the regulation of the internal systems, structures and office bearers of municipalities.  
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The more relevant sections of the MStr are those that relate to the establishment of 
the committees of the municipality.  In terms of section 33, a municipality may 
establish a committee if the establishment of the committee is necessary, taking into 
account the extent of the functions and powers of the municipality; the need for the 
delegation of those functions and powers in order to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness in their performance; and the financial and administrative resources of 
the municipality available to support the proposed committee. 
 
Sections 79 and 80 create non-executive and executive committees: Section 79 
committees are non-executive committees that may be established for the effective 
and efficient performance of any of a municipal council‘s functions, or the exercise of 
any of its powers, provided that the municipal council determines the functions of a 
committee and delegates duties and powers to it. The council must appoint the 
chairperson, and may authorise a committee to co-opt advisory members who are 
not members of the council within the limits determined by the council. The council 
may also determine a committee‘s procedure.   
 
Section 80 committees are provided for to assist the executive committee or 
executive mayor. If a municipal council has an executive committee or executive 
mayor, it may appoint, in terms of section 79, committees of councillors to assist the 
executive committee or executive mayor. Such committees may not in number 
exceed the number of members of the executive committee or mayoral committee. 
The executive committee or executive mayor appoints a chairperson for each 
committee from the executive committee or mayoral committee, and may delegate 
any powers and duties of the executive committee or executive mayor to the 
committee. Section 80 committees must report to the executive committee or 
executive mayor in accordance with the directions of the executive committee or 
executive mayor. 
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3.5 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act  
 
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, No. 32 of 2000 (MSA), makes 
provision for the core principles, mechanisms and processes that are necessary to 
enable municipalities to move progressively towards the social and economic 
upliftment of local communities. In section 6, the said Act sets out the duties of 
municipal administrations, including the requirement that the administration of a 
municipality must be responsive to the needs of the local community; must facilitate a 
culture of public service and accountability amongst staff; must take measures to 
prevent corruption; must give members of the local community full and accurate 
information about the level and standard of municipal services they are entitled to 
receive; and must inform the local community how the municipality is managed, of 
the costs involved and the persons in charge. 
 
The oversight function of a municipal council is not spelt out clearly, although section 
11(3)(j) of the MSA lists one of the functions of council as the monitoring of the 
impact and effectiveness of any services, policies, programmes or plans. 
 
Schedules 1 and 2 to the Act contain codes of conduct for councillors and municipal 
staff members.  
 
3.6 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 
 
The Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, No. 56 of 2003 
(MFMA), is aimed at providing secure, sound and sustainable management of the 
financial affairs of municipalities and other institutions and standards for the local 
sphere of government.  
 
The said Act deals with numerous financially related matters, of which the following 
are worth mentioning: The responsibilities of Mayors regarding financial matters and 
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the delegations of mayoral powers and duties in relation thereto (Chapter 7); the 
responsibilities of municipal officials regarding financial matters, including the role of 
the municipal managers as accounting officers; the fiduciary responsibilities of 
accounting officers; and the general financial management functions (Chapter 8). 
Chapter 12 deals with financial reporting and auditing and Chapter 15 with financial 
misconduct, including disciplinary and criminal proceedings. 
 
Section 132 of the MFMA is an important section that deals with unauthorised, 
irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure; liability for such expenditure; and the 
manner in which such expenditure may be condoned. The political office-bearers of a 
municipality are liable for unauthorised expenditure if they, knowingly, or after having 
been advised by the accounting officer of the municipality that the expenditure is 
likely to result in unauthorised expenditure, instruct an official of the municipality to 
incur the expenditure. The accounting officer is liable for unauthorised expenditure 
that is deliberately or negligently incurred by the accounting officer. Any political 
office-bearer or official of a municipality who deliberately or negligently committed, 
made, or authorised an irregular expenditure, is liable for that expenditure; or any 
political office-bearer or official of a municipality who deliberately or negligently made 
or authorised a fruitless and wasteful expenditure is liable for that expenditure.  
 
The MFMA further requires that a municipality must recover unauthorised, irregular or 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure from the person liable for that expenditure, unless 
the expenditure, in the case of unauthorised expenditure, is authorised in an 
adjustments budget, or is certified by the municipal council, after investigation by a 
council committee as irrecoverable and written off by the council.  Irregular or fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure can be certified by the council as irrecoverable and written 
off by the council after investigation by a council committee. The investigations that 
are required by a council committee potentially are an area of work for a public 
accounts committee. 
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Another important section of the MFMA is 129, which deals with the production of an 
oversight report based on a review of the annual report. The council of a municipality 
must consider the annual report of the municipality by no later than two months from 
the date on which the annual report was tabled in the council. Council is obliged to 
then adopt an oversight report containing the council‘s comments on the annual 
report, which must include a statement whether the council has approved the annual 
report with or without reservations, or has rejected the annual report; or has referred 
the annual report back for revision of those components that can be revised.  
 
Subsection 129(2) requires that the accounting officer attend council and council 
committee meetings at which the annual report is discussed, for the purpose of 
responding to questions concerning the report.  The accounting officer has to make 
public an oversight report within seven days of its adoption. 
 
In terms of subsection 129(4), the National Treasury is given the discretion to issue 
guidelines on the manner in which municipal councils should consider annual reports 
and conduct public hearings, and the functioning and composition of any public 
accounts or oversight committees established by the council to assist it to consider 
an annual report. However, the subsection points out that no guidelines issued in 
terms of subsection (4) are binding on a municipal council unless adopted by the 
council. 
 
Section 130 provides for council meetings to be open to the public. The meetings of a 
municipal council at which an annual report is to be discussed, or at which decisions 
concerning an annual report are to be taken, must be open to the public. 
 
Section 131 deals with issues raised by AGSA in audit reports. A municipality must 
address any issues raised by the AGSA in an audit report. The mayor of a 
municipality must ensure compliance by the municipality with the obligation to 
address matters pointed out by the AGSA. To this end it is likely that a municipal 
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PAC would be expected to assist and advise council, although the Act does not 
specifically state this. Section 131 also allocates a role to another sphere of 
government by requiring of the MEC of local government in the relevant province to 
exercise a certain degree of oversight: The MEC for local government in the province 
must assess all annual financial statements (AFS) of municipalities in the province; 
the audit reports on such statements; any responses of municipalities to such audit 
reports; and must also determine whether municipalities have addressed any issues 
raised by the AGA in audit reports adequately; and report to the provincial legislature 
any omission by a municipality to adequately address those issues within 60 days. 
This provision enforces arm‘s-length oversight by the provincial government and, 
theoretically, may have relevance in the case of any consideration by the province to 
intervene in terms of section 139 of the RSA Constitution – see par 3.1 above. 
 
The MFMA also provides for categories of expenditure and disclosure requirements 
that inform oversight mechanisms such as PACs. Section 1 defines categories such 
as unauthorised expenditure, irregular expenditure, and fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure. In terms of section 15, a municipality may, except where otherwise 
provided for in the MFMA, incur expenditure only in terms of a council approved 
budget, and within the limits of the amounts appropriated for the different votes in an 
approved budget. Expenditure is irregular if incurred by a municipality or municipal 
entity in contravention of, or not in accordance with, inter alia, a requirement of the 
MFMA which has not been condoned by the National Treasury. Fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure is expenditure that was made in vain and would have been 
avoided had reasonable care been exercised. Based on the principle that legislatures 
have ultimate authority over public funds – and this would include municipal 
legislatures in the form of the council – the legislatures are obliged to deal with 
instances of unauthorised expenditure. In the national and provincial government 
spheres in South Africa, the way to have funds approved or validated once it has 
already been spent, but without authority, is through a Finance Act that can only be 
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prepared upon recommendation from the PAC.  In the case of the local government, 
there are no statutory or regulatory requirements or guidance for such a process. 
 
Section 166 of the MFMA provides for the establishment of audit committees within 
every municipality – an independent advisory body on which councillors may not 
serve, but which is obliged to advise council, among others, and therefore possibly a 
public accounts committee of council.  
 
Chapter 15 of the MFMA deals with financial misconduct by municipal officials, 
including the accounting officer of the municipality, the chief financial officer and 
senior management. Section 173 provides a list of the various offences, and the Act 
stipulates fines or imprisonment as penalties, in section 174, for a period not 
exceeding five years. 
 
3.7 Public Audit Act  
 
The Public Audit Act, No. 25 of 2004 (PAA), expands on, amongst others, sections 
181 and 188 of the RSA Constitution establishing the AGSA as the external auditor 
of all public sector institutions including municipalities. The Act requires the AGSA to 
submit audit reports to any legislature that has a direct interest in the audit – this 
includes the council of a municipality – and to any other authority prescribed by 
national legislation, and to make all reports public. In the case of the municipality, the 
public-making takes place by means of including the audit report in the annual report 
of the municipality concerned which is tabled in the municipal council.  
 
The AGSA must prepare audit reports that contain an opinion on or conclusion about 
whether the AFS of the municipalities give a fair presentation in all material respects 
of the financial position at a specific date and of the results of its operations and cash 
flow for the period which ended on that date, in accordance with the applicable 
financial framework and legislation. The report must also reflect on the municipality‘s 
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compliance with any applicable legislation relating to financial matters; financial 
management and other related matters; and the reported information relating to its 
performance against predetermined objectives. In addition, the AGSA may report on 
whether the resources of the municipality were procured economically and utilised 
efficiently and effectively. 
 
3.8 Statutory and regulatory guidance on oversight committees  
 
As is set out in par 3.1 above, the RSA Constitution provides for non-executive 
oversight mechanisms and principles within the national and provincial spheres of 
government. As far as local government is concerned, the RSA Constitution makes 
no mention of similar oversight powers. Chapter 7, which deals with local 
government, does not make mention of any separation of powers or accountability 
obligations concerning the executive members of councils. Section 151(2) states that 
both the executive and the legislative authority of a municipality are vested in its 
Municipal Council, but it does not clarify the subdivision of these powers. However, 
as ‗democratic and accountable government‘ is the first object of local government in 
terms of section 152 of the Constitution, it is assumed that oversight – a core element 
of accountable governance – should also form part of the governance systems in the 
local sphere of government.  
 
Although a whole series of local government Acts and regulations were passed 
following the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, there is little statutory or 
regulatory guidance available in South Africa regarding non-executive oversight. The 
strongest statutory indication of a separation between the executive and non-
executive functions within a municipality is found in sections 79 and 80 of the MSA.  
Section 79 enables the establishment of committees to fulfil a council‘s functions, 
which presumably includes the non-executive oversight functions of a municipal 
council. Section 80 provides for committees that can be established for purposes of 
assisting and reporting to the executive committee or executive mayor in accordance 
with the directions of the executive committee or executive mayor, i.e. executive 
 50 
committees. However, the MSA does not stipulate the powers or oversight functions 
applicable to the section 79 committees. More clarity in this regard will have been 
achieved if the powers of a section 79 committee were provided for in the same way 
that sections 55 and 114 of the RSA Constitution clarifies the powers of the oversight 
committees of the national and provincial legislatures. 
 
The MFMA of 2003 does not provide much further clarity with regard to the powers 
and functions of non-executive oversight committees. For example, although the 
MFMA refers to the establishment of oversight committees, it does not impose the 
establishment of such committees. Section 129 of the MFMA merely refers to the 
councils having the discretion to establish public accounts or oversight committees to 
assist them to consider the municipality‘s annual report and produce an oversight 
report. Such discretion means that municipalities have freedom of choice whether or 
not to establish non-executive oversight committees, and as indicated in Table 1.1 on 
page 6  most municipalities have exercised this freedom of choice by not appointing 
MPACs.   
 
None of the regulations issued in terms of the aforementioned Acts assist in clarifying 
any intended non-executive oversight or scrutiny processes, except in section 6 of 
the regulations issued in terms of the MFMA as it relates to oversight of supply chain 
management. This requires that the council of a municipality maintain oversight over 
the implementation of the supply chain management policy.  However, there is no 
stipulation in the said regulations for the establishment of any non-executive 
oversight committee for purposes of non-executive oversight of supply chain 
management. 
 
3.9 National Treasury Circular 32 on oversight committees 
 
In March 2006, the National Treasury issued MFMA Circular No 32: ―The Oversight 
Report‖, with the aim of providing councillors with practical guidance in financial 
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governance and to assist in maintaining oversight within the broader governance 
context.  Circular 32 was also aimed at providing practical guidance with respect to 
the process that councils have to follow when considering the annual report and 
producing the oversight report that are required in terms of section 129(1) of the 
MFMA.  In terms of section 129 of the MFMA, an ―oversight report‖ is required from 
all municipalities by the end of March every year. In this report the Council has to 
state whether it – 
 
 approves the annual report,  
 rejects the annual report, or  
 refers the annual report back for revision.  
 
However, no specific reference is made to scrutiny of the annual financial statements 
of the municipality or the review of the report of the AGSA.  Section 129(4) of the 
MFMA assumes that municipalities will have oversight or public accounts committees 
as part of the financial management system, and in particular with regard to the 
annual report and the resultant oversight report, but there is no reference to an 
obligation that the municipality has to appoint such a committee. Neither does the Act 
differentiate between the functions of an oversight committee and an MPAC.   
 
Circular 32 does confirm a number of important principles in relation to governance 
and accountability processes within the municipal sphere. For example, it confirms 
that –  
 
 The mayor is accountable to council, and in turn has oversight over the 
municipal manager;  
 The municipal manager has oversight over the administration, and is 
accountable to the mayor or the mayoral committee; 
 The mayor or the executive committee is obliged to resolve any performance 
failures; and  
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 Ultimately the council is vested with the power and responsibility to oversee 
both the executive and administration. 
 
Circular 32 also provides detailed guidance with regard to key steps in the annual 
reporting process within the annual accountability cycle – see Table 3.1 below.  
 
  
 
Source: National Treasury Circular 32, 2006: 17 
Table 3.1: Steps in the annual reporting processes 
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Circular 32 therefore assumes a separation of powers between councillors serving on 
the executive (i.e. mayor or executive committee) and non-executive councillors. This 
separation is proposed as vital to ensure that council maintains oversight of the 
performance of specific responsibilities and delegated powers to the mayor or 
executive committee.  
 
Circular 32 provides a number of recommendations on how council oversight can be 
strengthened by the establishment of an oversight committee. (It is important to note, 
though, that none of the MPACs in Gauteng had identified Circular 32 as giving 
adequate guidance as far as their mandate and the functioning as MPACs are 
concerned.) 
 
Circular 32 provides the following additional guidelines with regard to the role and 
functions of the oversight committee, many of which may be also relevant to the 
terms of reference of an MPAC: 
 
 An oversight committee should be established under sections 33 and 79 of the 
Municipal Structures Act 1998; 
 
 The oversight committee is responsible for the detailed analysis and review of 
the annual report and then drafting an oversight report to be taken to full council 
for discussion; 
 
 The oversight committee may receive and review representations made by the 
public and also seek inputs from other councillors and council portfolio 
committees; 
 The oversight committee should be made up of non-executive councillors only, 
and representatives of the community, and can be formed each year to deal 
with the annual report (officials cannot be members of an oversight committee); 
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 Assistance from the municipality‘s Audit Committee in the review process is also 
recommended as a major source of independent specialist advice; 
 
 All meetings of Council and the oversight committee at which an annual report is 
considered must be open to the public; 
 
 Representatives of the AGSA are entitled to attend and to speak at any 
meetings held to discuss the annual report; 
 
 Timely notice of meetings should be given to enable representations to be made 
(making representations to the oversight committee should not necessarily 
preclude representations by the same individuals to the full council as this 
promotes transparency in the process); 
 
 As a parallel process, other councillors should also be conducting their own 
reviews of the report, which can include discussions with constituents, ward 
committees and ward representatives to encourage inputs and comments and 
to prepare for the full council meeting that considers the annual report and 
oversight report; 
 
 Questions raised with the administration should ideally be responded to 
immediately during committee meetings to avoid delays – the top management 
team may assist the accounting officer, if needed; if the executive or the 
accounting officer and administration are unable to respond immediately to 
questions raised at committee or council meetings, the committee or council 
may rightfully conclude that the executive and administration have not 
performed satisfactorily and may not understand the report that they have 
tabled; 
 
 When enquiring on matters in the annual reports from municipal entities, issues 
of commercial confidence may arise – in such cases the council should form a 
judgement as to whether the information is essential to determine a conclusion 
on the annual report, or whether it may be necessary to meet in private (such a 
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step must be taken with caution to avoid weakening the democratic and 
transparency objectives of the annual reporting process); and 
 
 Municipalities should take into account all costs of the various mechanisms 
(oversight committee and other meetings) for reviewing the annual report and 
preparing an oversight report – the cost needs to be balanced against the need 
for transparency, good governance practice and accountability, the capacity of 
the municipality and the need for an effective process within the time allowed. 
 
Circular 32 further provides an illustration of municipal council oversight as financial 
governance in practice (see Figure 3.1 on the next page). However, although the 
proposed process proposes that the municipal council should consider the 
―authoritative and credible view‖ of the audit committee – an advisory committee – no 
reference is made to council considering input from the oversight committee 
mentioned in section 129 or the MPAC.   
 
3.10 Conclusion  
 
The RSA Constitution and other relevant legislation provide a clear and definite 
framework for legislative oversight of executive authority actions within the national 
and provincial spheres in South Africa. This is not the case as far as the municipal 
sphere is concerned. Although the Municipal Structures Act establishes municipal 
executive structures, such as executive mayors and mayoral committees, there is a 
weak policy framework as far as the role and functions of non-executive council 
structures are concerned.  As the legislative and executive powers of a municipality 
are combined in the municipal council, a clear statutory framework indicating the 
differences between the executive and non-executive functions and structures within 
municipal councils could have assisted municipalities to deal with the financial non-
executive oversight more effectively.  
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The MFMA introduces the concept of oversight, but is not specific about council 
structures that are supposed to conduct oversight. The guidelines that the National 
Treasury has issued in the form of Circular 32 are not enforceable.  For these to be 
enforceable, the guidelines have to be issued as regulations, as has been done in 
the case of the requirements for non-executive council oversight of supply chain 
Source: National Treasury Circular 32, 2006: 3 
Figure 3.1: 
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management processes. As far as MPACs are concerned, national policy direction, 
therefore, is very weak.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter it was established that any municipality that decides to 
establish an MPAC, will do so within the context of a weak statutory framework and 
with limited policy direction as far as the powers and functions of an MPAC is 
concerned. The establishment by the City of Cape Town (CoCT) of a committee on 
public accounts in 2006 as the first of its kind in South Africa took place within this 
limited framework. This was done with the hope that the CoCT would reap the same 
governance benefits as public sector oversight structures had within other spheres of 
government where public accounts committees had been in existence.  
 
By the time of this study, the CoCT PAC had been in existence for more than three 
years. The research questions framed at the beginning of the study were therefore 
aimed at establishing the extent to which the CoCT succeeded in establishing an 
effective MPAC and what lessons it had learnt in the process.  
 
This chapter sets out the rationale for electing to study the MPAC of the CoCT, as 
well as the research methodology and approach. 
 
4.2 Qualitative research method 
 
The research method that was followed is of a qualitative nature because of the 
ability of this approach to interpret or understand human and organisational 
behaviour (Welman, 2005:6) because of its suitability to attend to the ―holistic nature 
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of knowledge building‖ and to produce knowledge ―through an ongoing interplay 
between theory and methods, researcher and researched‖ (Hesse-Biber, 2006: 5). 
 
The substantial body of theory and method associated with PACs as an oversight 
mechanism, as set out in the literature study in Chapter 2, served as solid 
background to the interchange that the researcher planned to have with the 
respective respondents and documentary material. This study was undertaken in 
order to come to an understanding of a municipal public accounts committee 
operating within the local government sphere in South Africa.  
 
A large number of the studies covered by the literature are quantitative in nature, 
providing perspective on the extent of the various public accounts committee 
practices, but not always providing much perspective on the reasons for those 
practices. The qualitative research approach was chosen in order to not only study 
the committee practices, but also to learn how these practices came about and to 
gain insight into  the underlying reasons behind the practices.   
 
The qualitative method of research is like ―working through a qualitative window into 
knowledge construction‖ and is aimed at ―gaining complex knowledge directly from 
people with certain attributes or life experiences‖ (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006:4).  
The number of observations is limited compared to quantitative research, and 
concern ―the analysis of words rather than numbers‖ (Gerring, 2007:216).  Qualitative 
research is a ―descriptive form of research‖ useful in describing, amongst others, 
institutions (Welman, 2005:188 and 193) and is therefore well suited to describing the 
what, why and how of this municipal institution. Finally, the qualitative method is often 
associated with case studies (Gerring, 2007:10) and therefore is suitable to the 
approach adopted for this research.  
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4.3 Case study approach 
 
A case study approach was chosen in order to gain in-depth knowledge of an 
individual and representative example of a municipal public accounts committee. The 
first established municipal public accounts committee in South Africa was chosen to 
achieve a deep understanding of the extent to which generally accepted public 
accounts committee practices had been adopted, because, as Gerring points out, a 
proper single case study is ―more helpful than fleeting knowledge about a large 
number of examples‖ (2007:1).  
 
The case study is described as the most flexible design for research, and useful 
where ―relatively little previous research exists on the topic‖, a case in point as far as 
South African MPACs are concerned. According to Hakim, the case study is also 
useful for research on organisations and institutions in the public sector (2000:59), 
and also as an approach with the potential of being used to present examples of 
good practice (2000: 60).  
 
Gerring warns that the term case study can be ―a definitional morass‖ (2007:17), but 
in this instance there is no difficulty in demarcating the study as a comprehensive 
study of a specific phenomenon, viz a standing committee in the City of Cape Town 
established as the first municipal public accounts committee in the South African 
local government sphere. The intention is that the research results will, inter alia, 
inform or enlighten the researcher about the challenges associated with the 
establishment of an MPAC, and the lessons learnt or possible solutions for identified 
shortcomings. It is intended to be a study, therefore, of a single case with the 
purpose ―to shed light on a larger class of cases‖ (Gerring, 207:20). 
 
The case study approach was also chosen because of the potential to combine an 
intensive study of the CoCT MPAC with a more superficial analysis of a larger 
sample, i.e. some of the other MPACs established thus far in South Africa, with these 
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additional cases having the possibility of being brought into the study ―in a peripheral 
way‖ towards the concluding stage of the study (Gerring, 2007:22).  
 
4.4 Selection of the City of Cape Town municipal PAC as case study 
 
The selection of the PAC of the CoCT is based on a number of factors:  
 
 It is sufficiently representative of a broader set of cases as it is one of the six 
metropolitan municipalities and one of the 283 municipalities in the RSA.   
 
 The CoCT was established within the limitations of the statutory and policy 
framework applicable to all non-executive oversight committees in the 283 
municipalities in the RSA; 
 
 It was the first MPAC to have been established in South Africa; 
 
 The committee was specifically established as a public accounts committee, 
and not as an oversight committee – a committee referred to in the MFMA and 
which is often mistaken for the financial scrutiny committee); 
 
 It is presumed that the intention for establishing the committee was that it should 
function in a manner similar to public accounts committees elsewhere in the 
world, or at least South Africa; 
 
 The committee has been operational on an ongoing basis, meeting regularly 
since its establishment in 2006; 
 
 It has built up useful records and its members have gained considerable 
experience; and  
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 The committee was easily accessible geographically, but also in terms of 
allowing members of the public into its meetings. 
 
4.5 Data sources and selection of respondents  
 
Three main data sources were used in the research, namely documentary sources, 
observation reports, and reports on interviews with key role players.  
 
(a) The documentary sources included –  
 
 the RSA Constitution and a number of Acts that apply to local 
government that provide the statutory framework within which the CoCT 
PAC was established and operates; 
 MFMA Circular 32, a guideline on oversight reports issued by the 
National Treasury;   
 the Terms of Reference of the CoCT PAC;  
 file notes of the former chairperson of the CoCT PAC;  
 various sets of minutes of the meetings of the CoCT PAC;  
 various reports of the CoCT MPAC;  
 material presented at the inaugural meeting of the CoCT PAC on 18 
August 2006; and 
 the 2008/09 Annual Report of the City of Cape Town. 
  
(b) Observation reports consisted of – 
 
 Reports produced by the researcher upon attending meetings of the 
CoCT PAC on 18 September and 16 October 2009;   
 Notes from a workshop of newly established MPACs in Gauteng on 17 
April; and  
 Reports arising from conference discussions on municipal oversight 
and MPACs on 7 October 2008, and 29 & 30 September 2009. 
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(c) Self reporting took the form of transcripts of recordings of semi-structured, in-
depth interviews and follow-up telephonic interviews. 
 
As is often the case with qualitative research, the respondents were selected in a 
purposive manner, not randomly, by targeting ―key informants who, on account of 
their position or experience, have more information‖ than ordinary potential 
respondents (Welman, 2005:204). The objective was therefore to obtain the most 
information-rich spread of respondents.     
  
According to Willis, the qualitative researcher should ―(e)mphasize quality over 
quantity‖ and it is therefore better to conduct ―a dozen careful interviews, than simply 
to go through the motions in order to achieve a result that may be impressive but that 
is lacking in information value‖ (2005:259). In-depth interviews were therefore 
conducted with the following respondents:  
 
 The former, and first chairperson, of the CoCT PAC; 
 The current chairperson of the CoCT PAC; 
 A senior member of the CoCT PAC;  
 The chief audit executive of the CoCT; 
 The audit manager: SCOPA (who provides full- time support to the CoCT PAC); 
 The chief director in the National Treasury responsible for guidance on municipal 
governance and accountability systems; and 
 The Western Cape operations leader of the AGSA. 
 
Informal discussions were also held with the media representatives who regularly 
cover the CoCT PAC meetings. (See Appendix 2 for more detail on the interviewees.) 
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4.6 Access to data  
 
As far as access to data is concerned, the sources for primary data were easily 
accessible given the proximity of the CoCT and the helpfulness of the support staff of 
the CoCT PAC, but most importantly because of the willingness of the former and 
current chair-persons of the committee, as well as other interviewees, to make 
themselves available for in-depth interviews. A further advantage was that the 
researcher, owing to his occupation, was privileged to have attended workshops of 
the CoCT PAC and other related discussion forums on the topic of municipal PACs 
for observation purposes. A further advantage was that two meetings of the CoCT 
PAC that were held during the main fieldwork phase of the research, made it possible 
for the researcher to observe the functioning of the committee in detail. Documentary 
sources were readily accessible, again owing to the cooperation of the members and 
support staff of the CoCT PAC, and owing to the efficient production of detailed 
minutes and verbatim transcripts by the committee secretary.  
 
 
4.7 Research instrument  
 
The main research instrument used was the interview guide for the semi-structured 
in-depth interviews (see Appendix 1). The semi-structured interview approach was 
chosen above a highly structured approach, as it was important that the interviewees 
should not ‗close up‘ and provide ―less frank and honest feedback‖, as is the 
tendency with structured interviews (Baily, 2007:99). Other reasons why a semi-
structured approach was regarded as the best way in which to obtain a detailed and 
informed perspective of the case of the CoCT PAC include –    
 
 The flow of the interview, rather than the order presented in a guide, determines 
when and how a question is asked; 
 Interviews are scheduled in advance and expected to last a certain length of time; 
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 The interviewer might engage in dialogue with the interviewee; and  
 Questions answered earlier can be skipped (Baily, 2007:100). 
 
It was anticipated that important new and relevant questions could arise during earlier 
interviews and such questions, according to Baily, could be asked ―of all subsequent 
interviewees‖ (2007:103). The need for flexibility in qualitative research interviewing 
was taken note of and ―sometime(s) questions in the interview (were) dropped on the 
basis of ongoing analysis and information received from earlier interviewees‖ (Baily, 
2007:103). 
 
The questions in the interview guide in Appendix 1 on page 104 were based on an 
analysis of 36 potential attributes of a public accounts committee. A comparative 
analysis by the researcher arrived at 20 generally accepted key practices of PACs 
across the world as identified by at least three out of five authoritative literature 
sources (see Table 2.4 on page 32). Care was then taken to ensure a high level of 
correspondence between the research questions and the questions in the interview 
guide so that the questions might ―elicit enough useful information‖ for answering the 
research questions (Baily, 2007:104). 
 
The final interview guide was only arrived at after having exposed earlier iterations to 
subject matter experts and a fellow researcher on accountability and oversight. Care 
was taken in the formulation of the questions in order to ensure that no leading 
questions that could influence the responses were asked. For answers to be 
interpretable and comparable ―all respondents must have the same idea of what a 
question is about – in other words they should define the topic in the same way‖ and 
be likely to find the question relevant (Foddy, 1993:190).  The respondents were 
mostly well acquainted with the terminology and concepts used in the questionnaire, 
as no complex terminology was used in the interview guide. Double-barrelled 
questions were avoided, as well as ambiguous or vague questions or concepts. 
Lastly, care was taken to avoid asking threatening questions and questions that 
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could sound critical and thereby lead to the interviewees feeling that they needed to 
defend or justify the practices or approaches of the CoCT PAC and related systems.   
 
The main limitation experienced during the research was the limited time available to 
the researcher, given his full-time career commitments.  This was compounded by 
the time-consuming nature of semi-structured interviewing techniques.  However, the 
results of the interviews provided very rich and useful information.  
 
4.8 Data analysis and interpretation 
 
As mentioned earlier, three sources of data were used: in-depth interviews; the 
researcher-observed committee meetings, and secondary documentary sources.  
 
The transcripts of the interviews were typed out by the researcher himself so that he 
would be able to note subtle aspects such as pauses or hesitations in answering 
certain questions. The notes made by the researcher during the observation of the 
committee meetings were typed out within less than 48 hours so that as much detail 
as possible of the meeting could be captured.   
 
The two main data sets, i.e. the interview transcripts, and the researcher‘s 
observation notes, supported by the secondary documents, were then reviewed in 
order to identify themes relevant to the research questions. This was done mainly by 
word analyses, i.e. identifying words that were used repeatedly, or key words in the 
context of the research topic and by coding. Throughout the process, the themes, 
words and codes were identified within the 20 generally accepted international PAC 
practices as main reference framework, and the broader conceptual framework 
provided by the literature review.   
 
The next step was to compare the two sets of findings with one another in order to 
determine the degree to which the findings coincided, so that the extent of validity of 
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the potential findings could be determined. It was therefore possible to compare the 
CoCT PAC described by the interviewees with what the researcher observed while 
attending the meetings of the committee, and from the review of the minutes of 
earlier committee meetings.  
 
Finally, the data were interpreted by formulating theories accounting for the observed 
patterns, to facilitate relating the results and findings to existing theoretical 
frameworks or models as presented in the available literature.  
 
4.9 Conclusion  
 
The in-depth interviews with key members of the CoCT PAC and other relevant role 
players, the researcher‘s review of the numerous documents relating to the CoCT 
PAC, and the researcher‘s reports produced while observing the said committee, 
provided high-quality data that enabled the researcher to reach the conclusions set 
out in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5:   
RESEARCH RESULTS – ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS FROM A CASE STUDY OF 
THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE OF THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter deals with the results of the field work carried out during the case study 
research described in Chapter 4. It provides a picture of how the CoCT PAC operates 
in relation to key internationally recognised PAC practices. The background and 
history of the CoCT PAC is described, and the function, powers, composition, key 
operational practices and other features of the said committee are analysed on the 
basis of findings delivered by the primary and secondary research.  
 
The results will show that, although there are a number of shortcomings in the 
mandate documents of the CoCT PAC, the said committee in practical terms reflects 
many of the features of a PAC. However, a number of challenges are identified that 
the CoCT PAC will have to overcome in order to live up to the expectation of being 
an efficient and effective PAC.  
  
 
5.2 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF ESTABLISHMENT OF CoCT PAC  
  
The City of Cape Town municipality serves a metropolis of approximately 3,4 million 
people. The council of 210 members employs approximately 22,000 staff and has a 
budget of more than R12 billion – nearly half of the total Western Cape provincial 
budget and more than many national government departments (CoCT Annual report 
2007/08:11).    
 
In 2006, the CoCT decided to establish its first ever public accounts committee – this 
was also to be the first municipal public accounts committee to be established in 
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South Africa. The proposal for the establishment of a PAC came from the city council, 
who proposed that the city should have a mechanism similar to the PAC in the 
National Assembly of the Parliament of South Africa. This was done inter alia in order 
to augment the work done by the CoCT audit committee, as the CoCT council was of 
the opinion that internal audit could not adequately deal with all the matters reported 
on by the AGSA. On 28 April 2006 the establishment of the CoCT PAC was formally 
proposed as a committee whose function it would be to hold the accounting officer 
and the councillors accountable for their spending of ratepayer‘s money and their 
stewardship of public assets.  
 
Since the establishment of the CoCT PAC, technical support to the said committee 
has been provided by the internal audit directorate of the CoCT. As no guidelines 
were available for the establishment and functioning of MPACs in South Africa, and 
as no other municipal PACs existed elsewhere in South Africa to possibly learn from, 
the internal audit directorate of the CoCT was tasked with the development of an 
operational framework for the committee.  A draft of terms of reference was 
developed with assistance from the AGSA in the Western Cape. A detailed draft ToR 
of 14 pages was presented to the newly established CoCT PAC during an inaugural 
meeting on 18 August 2006, but it had not yet been adopted by the CoCT council. At 
the inaugural meeting, orientation training was presented by staff of the AGSA. Soon 
after the inaugural meeting, the CoCT PAC invited the chairperson of the PAC in the 
National Assembly to give advice on key aspects of the work of a PAC. 
 
Since its inception, the CoCT PAC has held numerous meetings during which it, inter 
alia, reviewed the annual reports of the CoCT for the 2006/07 and 2007/08 financial 
years. The CoCT PAC produced two annual oversight reports as required by the 
MFMA. The last-mentioned function was carried out on behalf of the city council, for 
the city council to comply with section 129(1) of the MFMA. The CoCT PAC has also 
conducted a number of investigations on matters referred to it by the city council or 
by the executive committee of the CoCT. These investigations were mostly carried 
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out in order to advise the city council on whether or not it should condone reported 
cases of unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure. Most of the 
investigations have taken the form of closed meetings of subcommittees of the CoCT 
PAC at which officials of the CoCT are required to provide information. However, the 
CoCT PAC also holds regular meetings – up to once a month – that are open to the 
public and which city officials are required to attend in order to elucidate 
documentation referred to the CoCT PAC by the city council. The CoCT PAC 
interaction with the officials mostly take the form of public hearings typical of a PAC. 
At face value, therefore, the committee seems to be operating like a ‗typical PAC‘. 
However, the CoCT PAC needed to be studied in greater depth to determine the 
extent to which the intention to establish a PAC has succeeded.  
 
The results of the case study research into the various practices of the CoCT PAC 
are presented in the paragraphs that follow. 
   
5.3 ESTABLISHMENT AND AUTHORITY OF THE COMMITTEE 
 
Nearly every author who has written about public accounts committees has 
concluded, and most of the commentators on the newly established PACs in the 
Gauteng Province have pointed out, that it is of vital importance to have a formal and 
approved mandate and ToR for a PAC to succeed.   
 
As pointed out before, there is no statutory or regulatory requirement for a 
municipality in South Africa to establish a PAC. The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 
(MStr), however, creates the framework for executive and non-executive committees. 
Section 79 of the MStr enables councils to establish committees to whom it may 
delegate council functions. In contrast, section 80 provides for the establishment of 
what is clearly ―executive committees‖ – committees that may be established to 
assist the executive committee or executive mayor of the municipality to carry out 
their executive functions.  
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The CoCT used the section 79 provision to establish the CoCT PAC as a section 79 
committee and named it the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in 
terms of the System of Delegations of the CoCT.  Although the CoCT does not have 
a system of standing committees, the council decided that the committee would be 
named after the PAC in the National Assembly – the committee on which the CoCT 
PAC has largely modelled itself.  In terms of the governance structure of the CoCT as 
set out in its Annual Report, the CoCT PAC is reflected as a ‗section 79 committee‘, 
together with 13 other non-executive oversight committees established in terms of 
the Municipal Structures Act (CoCT annual report 2007/08:60).  
 
During its public meetings, the CoCT PAC came across as having clear direction and 
the chairperson and members appeared to be carrying their mandate with certainty 
about their role and mandate. However, during interviews with senior members of the 
CoCT PAC, these members expressed uncertainty with regard to the committee‘s 
mandate and its ToR. Neither the former chairperson, nor the incumbent chairperson 
was sure of the status of the CoCT PAC ToR – the chairperson was under the 
impression that the CoCT PAC ToR still needed approval by the city council. The 
incumbent chairperson was under the impression that the CoCT PAC could not 
initiate own investigations, whilst, in fact, the System of Delegations provided such 
authority to the CoCT PAC. A senior member of the majority party, who had been a 
member since the inception of the CoCT PAC in 2006 and from whom one would 
have expected more certainty, could not elucidate the CoCT PAC mandate and 
powers, and referred the researcher to the secretariat for clarity.  
 
On more than one occasion, interviewees remarked that they were in need of more 
clarity and that they were keenly awaiting training from an appropriate subject  expert 
to provide such clarity. A review of the CoCT PAC documentation also indicated that 
there was more than one version in existence of the detailed 14-page ToR first 
presented in 2006.  The CoCT PAC therefore did not have an up-to-date guideline in 
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which the ToR was explained or elucidated. The production of an appropriately 
detailed guideline or handbook in which the role, functions and method of work of the 
CoCT PAC is explained would be of benefit to committee members, staff and other 
stakeholders.  
 
The mandate, powers and delegated authority of the CoCT PAC is contained in 
paragraphs 49 and 50 of the System of Delegations of the council.  
 
Paragraph 49 provides the CoCT PAC with the authority to –  
 
1. Co-opt advisory members who are not members of Council provided that such 
members may not vote on any matter;  
2. Request a member of public to attend any meeting of the Committee to assist the 
Committee with the performance of its functions and duties; 
3. Determine its own operational procedures and Rules of Order in terms of a 
framework approved by Council; 
4. Investigate any matter within its terms of reference; 
5. Seek any information from, and have access to, any councilor [sic] and 
or/employee, and to direct all councilors and employees to cooperate with any 
request made by the committee; 
6. Have unrestricted access through the Office of the City Manager/Internal Audit to 
information relating to all personnel, books of account, records, assets and 
liabilities of the Council and to any other sources of relevant information that 
may be required from the Council for the purpose of its duties and responsibilities; 
7. Request councilor(s) and official(s) to be present at any meeting for interview and 
input regarding items on the agenda; 
8. Have direct access to internal and external auditors and to investigate any matter 
falling within the terms of reference of the committee; 
9. Have access to all accounts and financial statements of the municipality; all 
reports of the Auditor-General; information in respect of any disciplinary actions 
taken in terms of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), and 
information in respect of transgressions in terms of the MFMA; 
10. Ensure that the City’s oversight report as envisaged in section 129 of the MFMA is 
prepared for adoption by Council; 
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11. Consider and comment to the Executive Mayor on the reports of the AG on the 
accounts for the preceding financial year, and specific reports of the Auditor-
General; and queries, comments and responses in respect thereof; 
12. Recommend on any proposals for improving efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy in the financial sphere of the municipality; 
13. Liaise with the Audit Committee and any other relevant role players; 
14. Promote transparency and public accountability within the terms of reference of 
the Committee; and  
15. Evaluate, direct and supervise investigations into any matters within the scope of 
its duties and responsibilities including projects as requested by the Executive 
Mayor or Council. 
 
In addition, paragraph 50 delegates to the CoCT PAC the responsibility to: 
 
1. Obtain legal, technical and any other specialised assistance required to exercise 
their functions and duties within budget provided; 
2. Investigate the alleged misappropriation of municipal funds by Councilors and/or 
officials and report thereon to the Executive Mayor, the Speaker or Council as the 
case may be; and  
3. Investigate unauthorized, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure in terms 
of section 32 (2) of the MFMA with a view to recommending to Council whether 
such expenditure is irrecoverable or not. 
 
A striking feature of the CoCT PAC mandate as set out in the System of Delegations 
is the fact that matters may be referred to the committee, not only by the council, but 
also by the executive mayor. In terms of the 15th subparagraph of paragraph 49 of 
the System of Delegations, the CoCT PAC has the authority to evaluate, direct and 
supervise investigations into any matters within the scope of its duties and 
responsibilities, including projects as requested by the Executive Mayor or council. 
This is not normal practice for a PAC as the purpose of establishing a committee on 
public accounts is to provide the non-executive authority – in this case council‘s non-
executive members – with a mechanism to oversee the executive authority. A further 
and problematic implication of having the Executive Mayor refer matters to the CoCT 
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PAC is that the committee being obliged to report back to the Executive Mayor is 
inappropriate. Firstly, the CoCT PAC is a non-executive oversight committee that 
acts as an extension of the whole of council and is responsible for critically examining 
the results of the executive actions of the Executive Mayor, the executive mayoral 
committee and City Manager.  The report on the findings made by the CoCT PAC 
should therefore be furnished directly to council, so that council may hold the 
executive and city management accountable, should such action be recommended. 
 
Another significant and problematic feature of the System of Delegation relating to 
the CoCT PAC is that it is required to report to the Executive Mayor on certain issues. 
For example, the 11th subparagraph of paragraph 49 requires that the CoCT PAC 
reports to the Executive Mayor on its review of the reports of the AGSA. Although the 
main function of a PAC is to examine reports of the AGSA on the public accounts of 
its jurisdiction, such a task is normally undertaken on behalf of the parent chamber – 
in this case the council – in order to hold the executive accountable. Requiring the 
CoCT PAC to report to the Executive Mayor defeats the purpose of having a non-
executive financial oversight committee.    
 
 5.4 DESCRIPTION OF TERMS OF REFERENCE / OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE  
 
At the inception of the CoCT PAC in 2006, a document of 14 pages setting out the 
ToR of the newly established CoCT PAC was presented to the said committee. The 
purpose of the document was to provide detailed guidance to the members and staff 
of the CoCT PAC on the functions, powers and method of work of the said 
committee. The ToR also addressed the following important aspects: 
 
 the principle that the CoCT PAC should function in a non-partisan manner;  
 the convention that the committee should be chaired by a member from one of 
the opposition parties;  
 the principle that the AGSA is a key external source of information and advice; 
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 a proposal that the members of the CoCT PAC should be appointed for the full 
five-year term of council in order to achieve continuity; 
 the principle that the media plays an important role in reporting the activities of 
the resolutions of the CoCT PAC.  
 
However, the draft ToR also contained a number of aspects that did not align with 
generally accepted PAC practices. For example, the draft ToR proposed that – 
 
 a minimum of two meetings per year be held instead of more regular 
meetings;  
 executive directors of the CoCT management team attend meetings while 
general practice determines that the accounting officer – in this case the 
City Manager – should be the primary member of management answerable 
to the CoCT PAC;  
 sections from the RSA Constitution applicable only to committees of 
parliament and provincial legislatures also applied to the CoCT PAC; and 
 the CoCT PAC should report to the Executive Mayor instead of the full 
council of the CoCT.  
 
The draft ToR was never formally adopted and its status was uncertain at the time of 
the field work carried out in September 2009. The secretariat of the CoCT PAC 
indicated that they understood that the intention was for the ToR to be reviewed, but 
it was not clear who would be responsible for ensuring that a review was carried out, 
nor was it clear by whom the review should be carried out. (At the end of 2008, the 
committee‘s secretariat had tried to arrange for a subject matter expert to advise the 
council on the mandate and functions of a PAC in terms of best practices. The 
intention was that the subject matter expert would also have been contracted for 
purposes of suggesting refinements to the 2006 draft ToR. Unfortunately the subject 
matter expert who had been identified, was no longer available and another subject 
matter expert had yet to be contacted.) 
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5.5 THE CoCT PAC AND POLICY MATTERS  
 
The CoCT System of Delegations is silent on whether the CoCT PAC is entitled to 
consider matters of policy. The ToR document does point out that the CoCT PAC 
does not concern itself with the policies of the council or ―with determining their merit‖ 
but that the CoCT PAC is concerned with how policy is carried out.  It was also the 
understanding of all the interviewees that the CoCT PAC currently does not concern 
itself with policy matters, and that the other section 79 standing committees were 
charged with carrying out policy oversight from a non-executive perspective.  
 
The incumbent chairperson of the CoCT PAC did, however, remark that it was not 
always easy to draw the line between policy oversight and implementation oversight, 
and that he, at times, had had to hold members back from venturing onto policy 
terrain. This may partly be due to the fact that, during its review of the whole of the 
annual report for the purpose of producing the MFMA section 129 oversight report, 
the CoCT PAC members on a number of occasions engaged the city management 
on policy matters, as reported in the annual report. (See also Table 5.1 on page 81 
indicating that the majority of the CoCT PAC‘s findings and recommendations related 
to non-financial matters and not the impact of policy implementation, as is 
traditionally the role of a PAC.)   
 
 
5.6 LEADERSHIP, COMMITTEE COOPERATION AND COMMITTEE 
MEMBERSHIP  
 
As far as composition, leadership and committee membership is concerned, the 
CoCT PAC conforms to key features of a traditional PAC:  
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5.6.1 The Chairperson of the CoCT PAC 
 
The current chairperson of the CoCT PAC is a member of the official opposition. The 
former and first chairperson was also from an opposition party. All of the 
respondents, whether from the majority party or opposition parties, were of the 
opinion that this arrangement was appropriate, that it favoured the credibility of the 
CoCT PAC, and that it should continue. Over the years, many arguments have been 
put forward internationally in favour of having a member of the opposition chairing the 
PAC, and as many arguments have been made against such an arrangement. What 
seems certain, though, is that there is great symbolic value in a majority party 
supporting the principles of transparency and accountability by appointing a member 
of the opposition to chair such an important scrutiny committee.   
 
A senior member of the ruling party confirmed that his party had, from the beginning, 
taken a very deliberate decision that the CoCT PAC should be chaired by a member 
of the opposition and that this was still very much their view today. The former 
chairperson also had no doubt about this being the best arrangement in the interest 
of effective oversight. The current chairperson believed that such an arrangement 
was appropriate as it had to do with oversight over a government which is controlled 
by a different party, and that a chairperson from the opposition would therefore 
ensure a more watchful approach to the actions of the executive. He felt that a 
chairperson from the ruling party would not want to probe too deeply if the matter 
affected members of his or her own party. He indicated that it did, however, place a 
lot of responsibility on the shoulders of the chairperson to lead the CoCT PAC 
objectively and refrain from misusing his position for political point scoring.  He also 
pointed out that the members of the majority party on the CoCT PAC had the 
responsibility of acting with maturity, as they had to be prepared to own up when 
instances of mismanagement were revealed and they had to demonstrate that they 
were non-partisan in their decision making and deliberations 
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5.6.2 Non-partisan approach 
There was a definite non-partisan approach to business by the CoCT PAC. The 
decisions were taken democratically and collectively; to date it has not been 
necessary for the members of the respective political parties to exercise their right to 
vote on any matter. This approach is consistent with Hedger and Blick‘s proposal  
that any PAC should have an ―ethos of inter-party cooperation and bi-partisan 
approach by PAC members to enquiries and all activities‖ (Hedger & Blick, 2008:41). 
The incumbent Chairperson of the CoCT PAC, however, pointed out that it was 
necessary to hold behind-the-scenes discussions at times to ensure that the CoCT 
PAC reached consensus; demonstrating the importance of the role of the 
chairperson, whether inside or outside the committee room. All the interviewees were 
also of the opinion that the consensus approach was the main reason for the 
credibility of the CoCT PAC among other members of council, and why the full 
council of the CoCT never found it necessary to debate the reports of the CoCT PAC.     
 
5.6.3 Membership 
 
In terms of its membership, the CoCT PAC is a clearly non-executive committee as 
all members of the CoCT PAC are non-executive members of council. Within the 
municipal sphere of government, this is an especially important aspect given the 
weak separation of powers in municipalities between non-executive and executive 
functions.  
 
The CoCT PAC has nine members. This complies with the requirements of 
Stapenhurst‘s ‘ideal committee‘ of having between five and eleven members 
(2005:25).  Attendance of meetings by the members of the CoCT PAC is high. At the 
meetings observed by the researcher, all members were in attendance the 
attendance was also very high in terms of the minutes of other meetings that were 
perused,. All of the interviewees were of the opinion that the number of members was 
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adequate for the committee to fulfil its functions effectively, including the work carried 
out by the subcommittees.  
 
5.7 ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
As far as right of access to information is concerned, the city‘s System of Delegations 
provides adequate authority for the CoCT PAC to have unrestricted access to internal 
documents. However, interviewees reported that the CoCT PAC in practice struggled 
to obtain information. This is not surprising, seeing that the practice of the CoCT PAC 
is to request information directly from the department that deals with the matter, and 
not from the City Manager. It is only when the CoCT PAC does not get cooperation 
from departmental officials that the committee elevates the request to the City 
Manager, who is the Accounting Officer of the CoCT. In spite of the fact that the 
CoCT PAC has found that information was furnished quickly and effectively 
whenever requests for information were made to the City Manager directly, the CoCT 
PAC regards the City Manager as ―the last port of call‖ for requests for information.  
In September 2009, there was no agreed or formalised protocol on the manner by 
which the CoCT PAC would obtain the information it requires. 
 
5.8 COMMITTEE OUTPUTS 
 
The CoCT PAC has two primary areas of output: (i) The oversight report produced on 
behalf of the council after consideration of the annual report, and (ii) investigation 
reports arising from investigations mostly carried out by subcommittees of the CoCT 
PAC of instances of unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure.  
 
5.8.1 The Oversight Report 
 
During the months of February and March, the CoCT PAC is fully occupied with the 
production of the oversight report on behalf of the council. The production of an 
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oversight report is a requirement in terms of section 129(1) of the MFMA. In terms of 
the aforementioned Act, the main objective of an oversight report – therefore the 
main function of an oversight committee – is to review the annual report of a 
municipality in order to recommend whether the council should adopt the annual 
report with or without reservations, or whether the annual report should be rejected, 
or referred back for revision of certain components. The main functions of a PAC 
entail the examination of the accounts of the municipality and the report of the 
external auditor thereon, plus in general the scrutiny of the spending of public funds 
by the municipality. Nowhere does the MFMA prescribe PAC oversight functions.   
 
The CoCT has decided not to establish an oversight committee as other councils 
have done, but to assign the responsibility of the production of the oversight report to 
its PAC. The production of the oversight report entails (i) a review of the annual 
report by the CoCT PAC, and (ii) the obtaining of input from other section 79 
committees of council, as well as input from the public received via the city‘s sub-
councils. The CoCT PAC consolidates all inputs received from its own perspective 
and produces the oversight report, which it then presents to the council of the CoCT, 
―functioning as oversight committee‖.  
 
To do this, the CoCT PAC is allowed two months from the date on which the annual 
report is tabled in the council of the CoCT. Given that the CoCT PAC is obliged to 
complete its own review of the annual report, as well as consider input from the other 
section 79 committees and the public, the time available for the CoCT PAC to 
scrutinise the accounts included in the annual report, or to review the report of the 
AGSA, is limited. The examination of the city‘s accounts and the report of the AGSA 
does not involve detailed questioning of the accounting officer or other executives, 
with the result that financial scrutiny by the CoCT PAC is also limited. For example, 
only 36.5% of recommendations made by the CoCT PAC in respect of the 2006/07 
and 2007/08 annual reports were related to financial matters (see Table 5.1 on 
 81 
page 81). In spite of this, however, the production of the oversight report is the 
primary annual output of the CoCT PAC.   
 
Table 5.1 below illustrates that the extent of the CoCT PAC focus on matters is of a 
non-financial nature rather than the ‗traditional financial focus‘ of a PAC. In the CoCT 
PAC report on ―comments and resolutions in respect of the 2007/08 annual report‖, 
as well as in the minutes providing evidence of the meeting that dealt with the annual 
report, the majority of matters that were raised related to non-financial issues.  
 
 
Table 5.1:  
Ratio of non-financial vs financial matters probed by CoCT PAC  
 
Number of non-financial matters 
reported on 
Number of financial matters 
reported on 
 
Resolutions and comments on 2006/07 annual report 
 
15 
 
62,5% 
 
9 
 
37,5% 
 
Resolutions and comments on 2007/08 annual report 
 
11 
 
65% 
6  
35% 
 
26 63,5% 15 36,5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As far as the substance and content of the oversight report is concerned, the 
incumbent chairperson expressed concern about the manner in which the CoCT PAC 
pronounced itself on the adequacy of the oversight report. In both financial years 
since the inception of the said committee, it recommended to the council of the CoCT 
that the annual report should be adopted ―without reservation‖ as provided for in 
section 129 of the MFMA.  The chairperson was not sure how the committee could 
recommend adoption ―without reservation‖, despite expressing concern about certain 
Source: Own analysis 
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issues reported and despite the said committee having carried out investigations into 
instances of unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure.   
 
However, the CoCT PAC had been advised that it was a technical term and that, if 
the content of the report was correct and a true reflection of the activities of the city, 
the committee should recommend ‗unreserved‘ adoption. The chairperson clearly felt 
uncomfortable about the advice and believed that the COCT PAC required more 
guidance on the matter, whether from the National Treasury or from another relevant 
authority.   
 
5.8.2 Committee investigations 
 
The second key output of the CoCT PAC consists of investigations carried out in 
terms of the requirements of the MFMA which relate to a municipal council having to 
obtain full details of instances of unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure so that the council may consider, after investigation by a committee of 
council, whether or not to certify the expenditure in question as irrecoverable and 
have it written off.  
 
As in the case of the section 129 oversight report required by the MFMA, the CoCT 
PAC investigations of instances of unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure is a key focus area of the said committee. Section 32 of the MFMA 
requires that a committee of a municipal council must advise the council on instances 
of unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure for the council to be in 
a position to take informed decisions on whether or not to condone the expenditure.  
 
A practice that the CoCT PAC has developed is to appoint subcommittees consisting 
of an average of three members, as and when the need arises, to investigate 
reported instances of such expenditure. PACs often appoint subcommittees to assist 
with high volumes of work. In the case of the CoCT, the subcommittees enable the 
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CoCT PAC to investigate the relevant matters in proper detail and arrive at well-
informed conclusions and recommendations. The subcommittees carry out in-depth 
investigations into the matters before them, report to the full CoCT PAC committee, 
and the full CoCT PAC committee, in turn, reports to the council with 
recommendations on whether or not to condone the matters investigated (see Figure 
5.1 below).  
Figure 5.1:
CoCT PAC subcommittee investigations
Referral to CoCT PAC 
An instance of unauthorised, irregular or 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure is 
referred to the CoCT PAC for investigation 
in terms of section 32 of the MFMA
Subcommittee appointment 
The CoCT PAC appoints a subcommittee of 
approx. three members to investigate and report 
on whether the expenditure in question is 
irrecoverable
Investigation 
In order to arrive at informed findings and 
recommendations, the subcommittee collects  
as much as possible information , mostly by 
taking evidence from relevant officials
Reporting by subcommittee
The full committee of the CoCT PAC considers 
the report on the subcommittee’s findings and 
recommendations and adopts the report or 
refers the report back for additional informationCouncil decision 
The  CoCT council adopts or reject the 
recommendation of the CoCT PAC and the 
unauthorised, irregular  or fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure  is either written off 
or attempts are made to recover the 
expenditure from personal identified as 
liable report
Reporting by CoCT PAC 
The committee makes a recommendation to 
council on whether the instance of 
unauthorised, irregular  or fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure  is irrecoverable and should be 
written off, or whether it should be recovered 
from the person liable for that expenditure
Source:  MFMA section 32 and own research 
Recommendations based on the investigations of its subcommittees made by the 
CoCT PAC from its establishment until September 2009 have all been adopted by 
the council of the CoCT. Once the council of the CoCT has adopted the 
recommendations of the CoCT PAC they become a decision of council and are 
binding on the city manager. 
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5.9 COMMITTEE MEETINGS 
 
The CoCT PAC meets on a monthly basis unless the workflow does not justify a 
meeting. Meetings are scheduled well in advance and the agenda and other relevant 
documents are circulated at least a week in advance of meetings. The agenda of the 
meeting is also made available on the public website of the CoCT.  
 
Meetings are normally held on the 6th floor in committee room 1, adjacent to the 
main Council Chamber. The committee room is well resourced in all respects: The 
room is large and comfortable and well-equipped as far as sound and recording 
facilities are concerned, with a microphone for each member; the document packs 
are well prepared and referenced; minutes and detailed transcripts of previous 
meetings are available; and four dedicated support staff attend the committee 
meetings (i.e. a minute secretary and three professional staff from the internal audit 
directorate who provide technical advice and support).  
 
The aforementioned resourcing of the CoCT PAC reflects recognition of the CoCT 
PAC as an important committee of the council, compared to MPACs in Gauteng that 
have reported that their struggle for recognition includes having to battle to obtain 
committee rooms for meetings. 
 
The meetings of the full CoCT PAC are open to the public. Public meetings are 
preceded, however, by closed pre-meetings – preparatory sessions attended by 
members of all the political parties represented on the CoCT PAC. The aim of these 
preparatory meetings is for all members of the committee to agree on the approach 
to be followed and, together with support staff, to ensure that the meetings function 
efficiently and effectively. This practice gives evidence of the non-partisan nature of 
the operating style of the CoCT PAC and differs from portfolio committee meetings 
where members of the committee also meet beforehand, but in their separate political 
parties.  
 85 
 
Subcommittee meetings are closed to the public. Most interviewees regarded the 
closed subcommittee meetings as a necessary practical arrangement, seeing that 
this enables the committee to cover more work and because the matters investigated 
could affect the reputation of individuals implicated in the investigations. The 
incumbent chairperson of the CoCT PAC observed that, if the subcommittee 
meetings were open, members would be reluctant to probe deeply. He was 
comfortable that the situation did not comprise a completely hidden process, seeing 
that all the findings were tabled in the full CoCT PAC meeting at the end of the 
investigations, thereby bringing all members up to date and providing them with the 
opportunity to probe further should there be such a need. The full CoCT PAC also 
had the right to refer a matter back to the subcommittee if it was felt that more detail 
or further work was required to be done before the recommendations of the 
subcommittee could be adopted.  
 
The representatives from the CoCT management at the meetings of the CoCT PAC 
normally are senior managers and not executive managers. The City Manager 
normally only attends the annual meeting, at which the annual report of the city is 
presented. Most interviewees did not regard it as necessary for the committee to 
engage at the executive management levels, seeing that they were busy with 
information gathering and senior managers could provide the required information 
without the PAC having to ‗waste‘ the executives‘ time unnecessarily. However, this 
practice of the CoCT PAC, as reported earlier, at times resulted in delays in providing 
the committee with the required information.  
 
The method of questioning officials took an information gathering form rather than the 
probing style common to the provincial and national public accounts committees. At 
both the meetings that were observed, a large number of officials were present and a 
variety of issues served on the agenda. The incumbent chairperson of the CoCT PAC 
admitted that it may be more effective to separate the items and have interaction with 
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individual departments for two hours or so. This, he believed, would also assist in 
giving sufficient and focussed attention to the annual report in the way they were 
expected to handle it.  
 
5.10 WORK PROGRAMME 
 
As indicated in paragraph 5.8, the work programme of the CoCT PAC mainly consists 
of two phases. The first phase is concerned with the production of the oversight 
report on behalf of the council of the CoCT during February and March of every year. 
As the oversight report has to be presented to the council of the CoCT by the end of 
March, the sole focus of the CoCT PAC during this time is the oversight report. A lot 
of work has to be covered, however during the two months between the tabling of the 
CoCT‘s annual report and the submission to the council of the CoCT of the 
section 129 oversight report by the CoCT PAC. This involves examining the annual 
report of 192 pages, receiving a briefing from the AGSA on the audit report contained 
in the annual report, calling the City Manager and his staff to appear before the CoCT 
PAC to elucidate the content of the various sections of the annual report, receiving 
comments on the annual report from other non-executive committees of the CoCT, 
considering inputs from the public, and finally drafting and submitting the section 129 
oversight report.   
 
The question is whether the CoCT PAC can do justice to its examination of the 
annual report and, in particular, to its examination of the AFS and the AGSA report 
thereon? A review of the section 129 oversight reports reflects cursory examination of 
matters related to financial issues contained in the annual report during this two-
month period. The incumbent Chairperson of the CoCT PAC indicated that further 
examination of the AFS and the report from AGSA after the end of March was not 
feasible as members regarded the examination as having been dispensed with once 
the oversight report was produced and submitted to the council of the CoCT. Other 
interviewees also all indicated that it should be borne in mind that the members of the 
 87 
CoCT PAC acted in a part-time capacity and that it would be difficult to motivate 
members to return to a matter already dispensed with in order to deal with it in 
greater depth.  
  
The second phase of the CoCT PAC work programme consists of investigations 
referred to the CoCT PAC by the council of the CoCT or by the executive mayor. 
Planning for these investigations is difficult as it depends on the number of 
unauthorised, irregular, or fruitless and wasteful expenditures, as well as the number 
of referrals from council or the Executive Mayor. The investigations-driven work, 
however, takes up most of the CoCT PAC work between April and December every 
year. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: 
Annual work programme of CoCT PAC  
Jan  Feb  March  April May June Aug Sept  Oct  Nov Dec  
(Tabling 
of annual 
report of 
CoCT 
takes 
place at 
end of 
January)  
CoCT PAC 
reviews 
annual 
report, 
receives 
inputs from 
other sect.79 
committees 
and 
submissions 
from City 
Manager, and 
produces 
sect.129 
oversight 
report 
Council 
considers 
oversight 
report 
for 
adoption 
or 
rejection 
ito  
sect. 129 
of MFMA 
CoCT PAC holds monthly meetings, appoints 
subcommittees and refers matters to the subcommittees; 
receives reports from its subcommittees in respect of 
investigations into unauthorised, irregular, or fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure.  
 
Recommendations are submitted to the council of the 
CoCT on whether the instances of unauthorised, irregular, 
or fruitless and wasteful expenditure investigated are 
irrecoverable or not, and must be written off or not.  
 
During its monthly meetings, the CoCT PAC also follows up 
on the extent of implementation of matters which it had 
previously reported on, and which were endorsed by the 
council of the CoCT.  
   Source: Own research 
 
 
5.11 COMMITTEE RESOURCES  
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One of the strengths of the CoCT PAC is the administrative and professional support 
available to it. The minute secretary is able to produce minutes of a high standard 
within a week or two of the meetings. She also produces verbatim transcripts of 
meetings. Effective follow-up of the undertakings made by those who are 
accountable is a key element of an effective accountability process. The availability of 
transcripts of meetings therefore enables the CoCT PAC to carry out detailed follow-
up on the undertakings provided by the City Manager and other officials during 
previous engagements, and hold them accountable.  
 
The CoCT PAC enjoys very good technical support from the internal audit directorate 
of the CoCT. Two of the staff members who give support to the said committee are 
employed at management level, and the third staff member at executive level. One of 
the managers had been appointed specifically with the aim of supporting the CoCT 
PAC. Although she has internal audit responsibilities as well, she dedicates 
approximately 55% of her time to the work of the CoCT PAC. During peak periods 
the work of the CoCT PAC takes precedence. On request of the CoCT PAC, she 
sometimes also performs mini audits on matters before the Committee for which 
speedy additional information is required before the CoCT PAC can make informed 
decisions.  The external auditor, therefore, is not relied on to the same extent as has 
been observed in other jurisdictions in South Africa. The CoCT PAC is a political 
structure and should remain independent. 
 
The incumbent chairperson of the CoCT indicated that the quality of technical support 
would always be a key determining factor of the effectiveness of the CoCT PAC. He 
explained that it was unlikely that CoCT PAC members would ever be willing or able 
to examine the reports referred to the said committee to the extent necessary for 
effective scrutiny, and would therefore always be dependent on technical support in 
order to be effective. The incumbent chairperson of the CoCT PAC again pointed out 
that all the members were part-time members and did not have the capacity to carry 
out proper scrutiny without assistance from support staff. 
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The operational budget of the CoCT PAC forms part the annual budget of the internal 
audit directorate. However, as this arrangement has not been formalised by a council 
resolution, there is a risk of the funding of the CoCT PAC being affected, should the 
relationship between the internal audit directorate and the CoCT PAC degenerate. 
For example, in the event that the audit committee or the AGSA produce critical 
findings on the quality of the work of the internal audit directorate – which the CoCT 
PAC is likely to endorse – the relationship between the CoCT PAC and the internal 
audit directorate may become strained to the detriment of the CoCT PAC.  In the 
case of budget cuts within the CoCT, there is the additional risk that the internal audit 
division may prioritise its own funding needs before allocating resources to the CoCT 
PAC. 
 
However, the support and involvement of the internal audit directorate in the business 
of the CoCT PAC was clearly a key reason for the success of the CoCT PAC thus far 
at the time of the research. It will be important for the CoCT PAC to ensure that this 
support is retained.  
 
5.12 COUNCIL DEBATE OF CoCT PAC REPORTS 
 
The main purpose of a PAC report is to make recommendations to the PAC‘s parent 
chamber on the basis of the findings from investigations carried out on behalf of the 
parent chamber. If a PAC report is discussed in the chamber and is not merely 
adopted without debate, it has the advantage of the findings and recommendations 
being aired at a higher public forum. Such public debate generates public confidence 
in the accountability systems of the institution in question.  
The reports of the CoCT PAC have been adopted by the council without debate since 
its inception. The incumbent CoCT PAC chairperson expressed concern about the 
level of attention that the CoCT PAC reports receive from council members. He 
indicated that council members generally seem so disinterested in CoCT PAC reports 
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that they probably would prefer to agree to the adoption of the CoCT PAC reports 
outside of council meetings. He believed that fellow councillors should take note of 
the issues raised by the CoCT PAC as recommendations that were made were about 
serious issues. He also believed that fellow councillors should take more ownership 
of the recommendations and possibly use the opportunity during council meetings 
when the reports of the CoCT PAC are presented, to add additional perspectives.  
 
5.13  FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS 
 
A concern raised in most jurisdictions where PAC have been established  is that 
there is a lack of follow-up as far as implementation of recommendations is 
concerned. In most jurisdictions, the submission of a formal response to the parent 
chamber of the PAC within a prescribed period of time that generally ranges between 
three and nine months is generally accepted PAC practice. In practice, however, 
effective follow-up actions by parent chambers often seem to be non-existent.  
 
The CoCT PAC attempts to monitor the implementation of its recommendations itself 
once the recommendations have been adopted by the council. The considerable 
assistance in this regard from the technical support staff of the CoCT PAC was 
acknowledged by a number of other interviewees. There is no council rule requiring a 
response to CoCT PAC recommendations, however, and neither is there any 
stipulation concerning a period within which the municipal executive or the 
management of the CoCT has to respond to CoCT PAC recommendations. One 
would expect there to be a requirement, though, for a formal response to be 
submitted to the CoCT PAC by the City Manager on behalf of the executive and 
management of the CoCT.  
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5.14 STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS  
 
In general, the valuable role of the CoCT PAC seems to have been accepted by the 
key internal stakeholders in the CoCT, but there is no significant interaction or 
relationship between the said committee and key stakeholders such as the Speaker, 
the Audit Committee, and the Finance Committee. The City Manager honours the 
CoCT PAC with his presence only once a year during the said committee‘s review of 
the annual report based on the MFMA requirement to this effect. The CoCT PAC 
does not seem to regard it as a right to have more dedicated attention from the City 
Manager. In fact, the members seemed quite appreciative when the City Manager 
afforded the committee his attention and, during the last annual report review, 
personally undertook to ensure that the committee was provided with information it 
was seeking.   
 
There is no relationship between the CoCT PAC and the AC. This was a surprising 
finding, given the similarities in their respective mandates. The CoCT PAC could 
consider using the AC as another key source of information, seeing that the AC 
reviews quarterly reports of the internal auditors of the city, and should therefore 
have an informed perspective on the state of internal controls throughout the year. 
The insight and perspective of the AC would be an added source of information, 
seeing that the members of the AC are external independent experts, the AC could 
also be a credible source of advice.  
 
As far as external stakeholders are concerned, there is always attendance by the 
media of the CoCT PAC meetings. In an interview with two of them, media 
representatives indicated that they regarded the CoCT PAC as an important 
mechanism and were surprised that municipal PACs had not been established at all 
other municipalities. Regular media articles appear in the local newspapers following 
meetings of the CoCT PAC. The incumbent CoCT PAC chairperson indicated that 
the profile of the CoCT PAC, whether as a result of the external media or the internal 
 92 
grapevine, resulted in officials being quite worried when the CoCT PAC was 
investigating a matter and that this fact assisted in the said committee in being taken 
seriously.   
 
A good working relationship with the AGSA is regarded as an important factor for 
success. In the case of the CoCT PAC, there is a good working relationship. Owing 
to the strong support from the internal audit professionals elucidated above, the 
CoCT PAC is not unnecessarily dependent on advice and support from the AGSA as 
is the case in certain other jurisdictions. 
 
The CoCT PAC members who were interviewed regard public participation in the 
work of the CoCT PAC as important but a challenge, because the quality and extent 
of input from the public is disappointing. The CoCT PAC has also struggled to get 
fellow councillors – the public‘s representatives – to comment on the annual report for 
purposes of the oversight report. Although the annual report is submitted to sub-
councils and wards for comment, very little feedback is received by the CoCT PAC.  
 
5.15 CONCLUSION  
 
The CoCT PAC has been operating as a financial oversight committee for the past 
three years. A considerable amount of authority has been delegated to the committee 
and the said committee has been asserting this authority through various oversight 
activities that have resulted in recommendations being made to the CoCT council, 
thereby fulfilling the function of advising the council on matters referred to it.  The 
extent to which the committee has done so effectively, and the factors that have 
hampered the committee, are discussed in the next and final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Although no two public accounts committees can be expected to operate in a similar 
manner, there are certain international PAC practices that have been established 
over the years as generally accepted practice capable of strengthening accountability 
and proper financial oversight. Since 1991, when the CCPAC proposed 38 attributes 
for an effective PAC, international PAC practices have crystallised to such an extent 
that different authors are now in agreement about 20 generally accepted practices 
that can be regarded as fundamental features of a PAC.  
 
Based on the evidence produced by the case study of the CoCT, this concluding 
chapter contains an analysis of how the CoCT PAC compares in terms of the 20 
generally accepted PAC practices recognised internationally as vital to an effective 
PAC. In Table 6.1 on the next page, the adherence by the CoCT PAC to each of the 
20 identified generally accepted practices is assessed from two perspectives: firstly 
from the point of view of the documented framework within which the said committee 
has to function and, secondly, from a practical implementation point of view. In Table 
6.1, brief commentary on the reasons for adherence or non-adherence to generally 
accepted best practices is provided and this expanded on in detail in the remainder 
of the chapter.  The chapter also includes recommendations to the CoCT PAC on 
how to address the shortcomings identified on the basis of the theoretical framework 
derived from the literature study and the lessons learnt during the case study.  
 
The chapter ends with recommendations to the relevant national and provincial 
authorities on steps to be considered for improved guidance and support to MPACs. 
 94 
 
Table 6.1:   
CoCT PAC adherence to generally accepted PAC practice 
 
Generally accepted PAC practice 
CoCT PAC 
documented 
framework 
Comment 
CoCT PAC 
implemented 
practice 
Comment 
1 Established by legislation or standing rules X
Par 49 & 50 of System 
of Delegations not 
adequate in all respects 
X
Too much uncertainty or 
ambiguity about PAC role 
and its functions 
2 Examines financial performance & stewardship at year-end X
Mandate is ambivalent 
about core function X
A mix between oversight 
report committee, PAC & 
investigating committee 
3 
A written description of the PAC mandate / terms of 
reference exists  
X Only a draft ToR exists X 
Activities of CoCT PAC 
not guided by ToR 
4 
Focus of the PAC is on policy implementation, not policy 
itself  

No mandate for policy 
oversight 
Focus is on financial 
administration 
5 
Has power to compel any person to appear before it, and 
has access to any relevant information  
X 
Only CoCT staff & 
councillors 
No limitations thus far on 
requests for information 
6 The PAC has powers to initiate own investigations   Par 49(3)(a) X 
No own investigations 
initiated – not clear 
whether authority exists 
7 
Obtains parent chamber endorsement for recommendations 
to the Executive  
X 
Par 49(7) requires 
reporting to Mayor, par 
50(2) ambiguous 

Reports tabled in council 
and endorsed. 
8 Membership is limited to non-executive members  
Section 79 non-
executive committee 
Clearly operates as a non-
executive committee 
 
 
9 
It is preferable for the chairman to be from the opposition  X 
A convention not 
documented 
In practice opposition has 
chaired since inception 
10 
The Committee operates in a non-partisan manner; always 
strives for consensus 
X 
A convention not 
documented 
In practice CoCT PAC has 
operated ito this 
convention 
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Table 6.1:   
CoCT PAC adherence to generally accepted PAC practice 
 
Generally accepted PAC practice 
CoCT PAC 
documented 
framework 
Comment 
CoCT PAC 
implemented 
practice 
Comment 
11 
Public hearings are the norm, giving access to the general 
public and the media 
X 
A convention not 
documented 
Public meetings are the 
norm 
12 Frequent or regular meetings take place X 
No minimum meetings 
stipulated 
Meets approximately on a 
monthly basis 
13 Collaboration with other oversight committees is beneficial 
System of Delegations, 
par 49(9) 
X 
No effective collaboration 
with other committees 
14 PAC reports are always published and made public X 
A convention not 
documented 
In practice this has been 
the norm since inception 
15 
Primary source documents are reports of the Auditor-
General 

System of Delegations, 
par 49(3)(f) & (7)(a) 
X 
AGSA reports not the 
primary focus 
16 
Has adequate resources – secretarial, research and audit 
technical   

System of Delegations, 
par 50(1) 
Very efficient support in all 
respects 
17 
Members are exposed to specialised training/professional 
development 
X 
No minimum 
interventions 
documented 
X
No training 
took place in 2008 or 
2009 
18 
Debating on the PAC report takes place in the legislature 
(plenary) 
X 
No requirement 
documented 
X 
Adoption of reports take 
place without debate 
19 
Formal obligation for executive authority to respond to PAC 
recommendations  
X 
No requirement 
documented 
X Only officials respond 
20 
 
Records of proceedings of the committee are kept 
 
X 
No requirement 
documented 
Minutes and transcripts 
are kept  
 
Totals 
6/20 
(30%) 
 
11/20 
(55%) 
 
 
Source: Own analysis 
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6.2 ESTABLISHMENT AND AUTHORITY  
 
In practice, there is far too much uncertainty in the minds of the members and 
support staff of the CoCT PAC. Although the establishment of the CoCT PAC is 
recognised in paragraphs 49 and 50 of the System of Delegations of the CoCT, it 
does not provide sufficient clarity with regard to a number of aspects (see Table 6.1). 
There also is ambiguity about some of the powers of the CoCT PAC, such as the 
said committee‘s power to initiate own investigations. The CoCT has established its 
PAC with the clear intention of it being a fully fledged, non-executive financial 
oversight committee and the formal mandating documents should reflect this role 
without ambiguity.  
 
The function of a PAC should not be to act on behalf of the executive on any matter, 
but to oversee the financially related actions of the executive authority on behalf of 
council. The appropriate reporting line of the CoCT PAC should be to the council and 
the council only. Reports of the committee should concern the management of public 
funds by the accounting officer (City Manager) and his executive management team, 
and the directives provided to the accounting officer and team by the mayor and 
executive committee. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
6.2.1 In the absence of a national statutory framework for non-executive 
oversight in local government in general, and in particular for financial 
oversight through MPACs, the CoCT should obtain complete clarity about 
the role and mandate of a PAC and whether it is to function mainly as a 
PAC or as a hybrid committee. To this end the wording of the System of 
Delegations relating to the CoCT PAC needs to be revised by a legal 
adviser and a subject matter specialist.  
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6.2.2 The CoCT should revise paragraph 50 of the System of Delegations which 
deals with the specific matters delegated to the committee so that it is 
clear that the said committee’s core function is the examination of the 
city’s accounts and all AGSA reports thereon. (Currently the System of 
Delegations only deals with the investigation of unauthorised, irregular or 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure, and with alleged misappropriation of 
municipal funds.)  
 
6.2.3 The terms of reference of the CoCT PAC should state clearly that matters 
are referred to the said committee only by the council of the CoCT, and 
that the CoCT PAC reports to the council only. 
 
6.3 ROLE AND FUNCTION 
 
The System of Delegations is ambivalent about the core functions of the committee. 
On the one hand the CoCT PAC is clearly charged with the responsibility, on behalf 
of the council, of producing the oversight report required by section 129 of the MFMA 
– to function as the section 129 oversight committee of the CoCT. On the other hand, 
the CoCT PAC is called a PAC and is charged with reviewing the accounts of the 
CoCT and the AGSA reports thereon, as well as with investigating unauthorised, 
irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure, or other matters referred to it.  
 
However, in practice the CoCT PAC‘s first annual priority is to deal with the 
production of the oversight report stipulated in MFMA.  As previously indicated, the 
production of the MFMA oversight report is a function that can be undertaken by any 
committee of council, as the main activity is to collect inputs from various sources 
and produce a consolidated view on the annual report. The CoCT is large enough to 
afford a separate oversight committee, or an ad hoc committee that can be 
appointed for the months of February and March only.  
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Having a separate oversight committee will enable the CoCT PAC to focus proper 
attention on the AFS and the AGSA report thereon, both of which are contained in 
the annual report, and submit its input to the separate oversight committee. Such an 
arrangement will also enable the CoCT PAC to examine, from a public interest point 
of view, important matters that currently are not receiving attention, for example: 
 
 Long-term liabilities amounting to more than R3 billion (CoCT annual report 
2007/08:93); 
 Unspent conditional grants and receipts of more than R1,5 billion (CoCT 
annual report, 2007/08:99);  
 Deviations from supply chain management regulations (CoCT annual report, 
2007/08:131); 
 Major capital projects and management of cost overruns (CoCT annual report, 
2007/08:143). 
 
The CoCT PAC should continue its investigation of instances of possible 
unauthorised, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, as this is in line with the financial 
watchdog role of a PAC. What is important is that the core function of a PAC, i.e. the 
detailed examination of the financially related year-end information, is not weakened 
by other responsibilities. (In the interview with the Chief Director in the National 
Treasury responsible for the guidelines on the production of the oversight report, this 
person‘s only concern regarding the possibility of having separate committees was 
that resources are limited in the case of smaller municipalities.)   
 
Recommendations: 
     
6.3.1 As the name of the CoCT PAC suggests, the primary function of the 
committee should be to scrutinise the accounts or annual financial statements 
(AFS) of the CoCT and the AGSA report thereon. The CoCT PAC should 
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therefore preferably not double-up as a section 129 oversight committee 
responsible for the production of the oversight report.  
 
6.3.2 The CoCT should consider appointing a special oversight committee 
dedicated to production of the CoCT’s annual oversight report between 
January and March each year. This will allow the CoCT PAC the opportunity 
to provide input to such a separate oversight committee on the annual 
financial affairs of the CoCT when the other section 79 oversight committees 
make their input concerning their respective areas of responsibility. Such an 
arrangement will also enable the CoCT PAC to have an annual scrutiny 
programme that is not limited to the two months set aside by the MFMA for 
the production of the section 129 oversight report, and which allows as much 
scrutiny of the R12 billion budget of the CoCT as may be necessary. Such an 
arrangement will furthermore create the room for the CoCT PAC to examine 
the consolidated AFS, as well as the financial performance of each of the 
departments of the CoCT, separately and in detail. (See Figure 6.1 on the 
next page.)   
 
6.3.3 If the CoCT PAC should retain the responsibility of producing the oversight 
report, the System of Delegations should make it clear that it is a 
secondary function of the CoCT PAC. The committee should furthermore 
allocate adequate time for in-dept scrutiny of the AFS and the AGSA 
report thereon, which should continue to be scrutinised after the end of 
March once the section 129 oversight report has been dealt with. 
 
6.3.4 In order to clarify its role among key stakeholders within the CoCT, the 
said committee should consider developing a few high-level stakeholder 
actions aimed at interacting with stakeholders such as the Audit 
Committee and Finance Portfolio Committee. The support of the Speaker 
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for the work of the CoCT PAC is important, and the committee chairperson 
should ensure that the Speaker supports the committee. 
 
Figure 6.1: 
Proposed annual work programme of CoCT PAC 
 
Jan  Feb  March  April May June Aug Sept  Oct  Nov Dec  
Annual 
report 
tabled 
 
CoCT PAC 
carries out a 
provisional 
review of the 
AFS and the 
AGSA report and 
provides input 
to CoCT 
oversight report  
 
During its monthly meetings, the CoCT PAC runs detailed scrutiny 
sessions in respect of the AFS of the CoCT and all its departments and 
municipal entities, inter alia by means of a review of the report of the 
AGSA and the Audit Committee and by taking evidence from the City 
Manager and other relevant senior officials 
 
In December, the CoCT PAC tables a detailed report to the council of the 
CoCT, but may table interim reports on urgent matters throughout the 
year.  
 Throughout the year, the subcommittees of the CoCT PAC carry out investigations into unauthorised, 
irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure as and when the need arises, and report to the CoCT 
PAC upon completion so that recommendations can be forwarded to the council of the CoCT.  
   Source: Own research 
 
 
6.4 DESCRIPTION OF TERMS OF REFERENCE / OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE 
 
A detailed document describing the ToR document exists, but it is out of date and 
has no formal status. It also needs to be aligned to the System of Delegations.  
 
There are a number of good examples of PAC guidelines that can be used as 
benchmarks for the CoCT PAC to produce a clear and user-friendly guideline for its 
members. A local example is the 2003 guideline produced by the PAC in the 
National Assembly called Guidelines for Accounting Officers, Ministers and other 
persons appearing before the Committee. On the international front, there is the 
Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation‘s 2006 comprehensive but to the 
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point guideline called Parliamentary oversight – committees and relationships: A 
guide to strengthening public accounts committees.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
6.4.1 As soon as the System of Delegations has been revised, the CoCT PAC 
should produce a guideline that can be used by its members, but also 
serves to clarify the role and function of the said committee among all 
stakeholders. 
 
6.4.2 In addition, member training based on the guideline should be arranged as 
soon as the guideline is available and attendance should be obligatory for 
all members, new as well as long-serving members.  
 
6.5 ROLE IN RELATION TO POLICY 
 
In line with the generally accepted PAC practice, the CoCT PAC is not mandated to 
concern itself with policy matters, and in practice the said committee does not get 
involved in policy issues. 
 
Recommendation: 
 
Given the importance of the credibility acquired by a PAC if it functions in 
a non-partisan manner and if it does not involve itself in policy matters, the 
committee’s mandate documents should preferably stipulate that the focus 
of the CoCT PAC is on policy implementation and not on policy itself.  
 
6.6 ACCESS TO PERSONS AND INFORMATION  
 
The CoCT PAC is delegated to have access to any person and to documents within 
the jurisdiction of the CoCT. However, the said committee should reconsider its 
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practice of mainly requiring information from staff below the City Manager. In terms 
of generally accepted PAC practice, the committee should engage the most senior 
official, which, in the case of the CoCT, is the City Manager as the accounting officer.   
 
Recommendations 
 
6.6.1 The CoCT PAC should consider an arrangement or some form of protocol 
with the City Manager in terms of which complete and speedy information 
is provided to the committee upon first request. 
 
6.6.2 The protocol should stipulate that the executive director of the city 
department under review by the CoCT PAC always is to be present at any 
meeting at which matters affecting his or her department are being dealt 
with. It should further be understood that the relevant person is in 
attendance as a representative of the City Manager and on the 
understanding that he or she will provide the CoCT PAC with all 
information required, and without delay.  
 
6.6.3 The CoCT PAC should not be hesitant about demanding the presence of 
the City Manager at any of their meetings whenever his or her presence 
could assist in obtaining complete and expeditious responses to the CoCT 
PAC’s questions for scrutiny.  
 
6.6.4 Whenever possible, the Committee should hold separate meetings with 
the different heads of the respective departments so that the committee’s 
undivided oversight attention can be focused on the department before it.    
 
The CoCT PAC does not have the statutory powers of access to information that the 
committees of the national and provincial legislatures have, and therefore cannot 
access information from persons or institutions outside the CoCT‘s jurisdiction. As far 
as information required by the CoCT PAC from outside sources is concerned, the 
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said committee has no jurisdiction over non-councillors or persons not employed by 
the council. The committee has, in the past, been faced with situations where it 
needed information from persons that had left the employ of the city, so that the 
required information could not be obtained. The said committee is also not 
authorised to place persons appearing before it under oath, should the need arise. 
 
Recommendations 
 
6.6.5 The CoCT should consider approaching the relevant national authority, 
through the SA Local Government Association or another appropriate 
body, and propose that similar statutory powers be given to municipal 
committees to that enjoyed by committees of the national and provincial 
legislatures in terms of the RSA Constitution and the PPIPPL.   
 
6.6.6 The City Manager is the accounting officer of the city, and it should be a 
standing arrangement that he or she should be present at all meetings of 
the committee to ensure that all the necessary information pertaining to 
the matters before the CoCT PAC is provided. For practical reasons, 
however, leave of absence from meetings can be with the agreement of 
the chairperson of the CoCT PAC.    
 
6.7 POWER TO INITIATE OWN INVESTIGATIONS 
 
The wording in the System of Delegations document is not one hundred per cent 
clear about the committee‘s power to initiate investigations. In practice, there is 
uncertainty in the mind of important role players like the incumbent chairperson, and 
the committee to date has not initiated own investigations. 
 
Recommendations 
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The wording in the System of Delegations document needs to be clarified 
when it is revised. It should empower the CoCT PAC to initiate own 
investigations into matters that fall within its terms of reference. 
 
6.8 PARENT CHAMBER ENDORSEMENT FOR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 
EXECUTIVE  
 
The System of Delegations of the CoCT requires the CoCT PAC to report to 
three principals: the Speaker, the council, or the executive mayor, and, in respect 
of the reports of the AGSA, it requires reporting to the executive mayor.  
 
Recommendations 
 
6.8.1 The committee should have one line of reporting only and that should be 
to the council. This can be done via the Speaker, but then the wording in 
the System of Delegations should be consistent in this regard.  
 
6.8.2 The mayor and executive committee should only be able to refer matters to 
the CoCT PAC via the city council. 
 
 
6.9 MEMBERSHIP 
 
In practice, the CoCT PAC functions as a non-executive oversight committee, 
thereby complying with one of the key features of a typical PAC. However, the ToR 
of the CoCT PAC does not prescribe non-executive membership as a requirement. 
As far as the number of members is concerned, the membership of nine provides the 
CoCT PAC with an adequate number of members to carry out its work effectively, 
without membership being too large.  
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    Figure 6.2:     
    Reporting and referral lines of CoCT PAC     
  
Existing referral and  
reporting lines 
(CoCT PAC reports to three principals on 
different matters.  The Executive Mayor 
can refer matters directly to CoCT PAC 
for investigation and reporting.) 
  Recommended referral  
and reporting lines 
(As a non-executive extension of the 
council of the CoCT, the CoCT PAC 
reports only to the council. Executive 
mayor can refer matters to the CoCT 
PAC only via the council of the CoCT 
and not directly) 
 
  
  
              
 
Executive 
mayor 
 
  
                    
  
Executive 
Mayor 
Speaker Council       
Council 
(Speaker 
merely the 
chair of 
council) 
  
  
  
    
        
  
  
  
  
  CoCT PAC         CoCT PAC   
  
                    
  Source:  System of Delegations of CoCT and own research  
 
Recommendations 
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6.9.1 The System of Delegations should stipulate that membership of the 
committee is strictly limited to non-executive members. 
6.9.2 Even though the CoCT PAC started with seven members in 2006, the said 
committee should try and maintain its membership at nine members given 
the extensive investigative work carried out by the subcommittees of the 
CoCT PAC.  
 
6.10 OPPOSITION CHAIRPERSON 
 
There is no formal requirement that the chairperson of the CoCT PAC is to be from 
an opposition party, although this arrangement has been in place since the 
committee‘s inception. The 14-page ToR presented to the CoCT PAC in August 
2006 stated that the chairperson of the committee should be chosen from the 
opposition for purposes of ―efficiency and transparency‖, but this was not taken up in 
System of Delegations. In the three years that the committee has existed, this 
arrangement has proven itself successful and there is no reason why it should not be 
formalised.  
 
Recommendation 
 
The CoCT PAC should consider formalising the convention of having a 
member of the opposition as chairperson of the committee.  
 
6.11 NON-PARTISAN OPERATIONS 
 
Although the CoCT PAC in practice operates with consensus and in a non-partisan 
manner, the principle that the CoCT PAC should operate in a non-partisan manner 
was never formally adopted as an accepted practice. The principle was mooted in 
the draft ToR document, but as the ToR document was never formally adopted, there 
is the risk that the principle of non-partisan operations will not become an entrenched 
practice of the CoCT PAC.  
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Recommendation 
 
Although consensus decision making is a behavioural rather than an 
institutional factor, it would be in the interest of accountability and effective 
oversight if this convention could be taken up in a revised and formally 
adopted ToR document.  
 
6.12 PUBLIC HEARINGS  
 
The System of Delegations document does not stipulate that public meetings of the 
committee are the norm.  
 
Recommendation 
 
The System of Delegations should stipulate that the public meetings of the 
CoCT PAC should be the norm, and provide high level criteria for 
circumstances under which it will be reasonable and justifiable to hold closed 
meetings in an open and democratic society. 
 
6.13 REGULAR MEETINGS 
 
The draft ToR of 2006 stipulates a minimum of two meetings per year. In practice, 
the committee meets much more regularly. While it is difficult to predict the number 
of meetings required per year, a minimum of two meetings is highly inadequate. In 
practice, the CoCT PAC has found that it needed to meet approximately once a 
month. 
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Recommendation 
 
The committee’s final ToR should stipulate that it meets on a monthly basis, but that 
the chairperson may cancel any monthly meeting if the workload of the committee 
does not justify a meeting.  
 
6.14 COLLABORATION WITH OTHER OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS 
 
No requirement exists for the CoCT PAC to collaborate with other structures of the 
council. In practice there is inadequate collaboration between the CoCT PAC and the 
audit committee of the CoCT.  
 
Recommendation 
 
The committee’s ToR should provide guidance with regard to its relationship with the 
audit committee of the CoCT. In addition, the ToR of the audit committee should 
require the committee to forward quarterly reports to the CoCT PAC in which it 
provides details on possible areas of concern that the PAC should take note of.  
 
 
6.15 PUBLICATION OF REPORTS 
 
No norm exists with regard to the minimum period within which reports have to be 
published. In practice, the reports of the CoCT PAC are produced quite speedily and 
are published widely, including on the CoCT website.  
 
Recommendation 
 
There should be a requirement in the System of Delegations that the reports 
of the CoCT PAC must be printed and made public as soon as possible but 
no later than a month after adoption of the report.  
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6.16 REPORTS OF THE AGSA  
 
It is accepted practice that a PAC focuses primarily on the AGSA report on the 
annual financial statements of the jurisdiction that it oversees. The CoCT PAC 
primarily focuses on the production of the annual oversight report and on special 
investigations. 
 
Recommendation 
 
The System of Delegations, as it relates to the CoCT PAC, and the ToR, 
should stipulate that the primary function of the CoCT PAC is to scrutinise 
the AFS of the CoCT and its municipal entities, and to consider the report of 
the AGSA thereon (see also recommendation 6.1.2 relating to the 
establishment and authority of the CoCT PAC).   
 
6.17 ADEQUACY OF RESOURCES 
 
Although the minimum resource requirements for the CoCT PAC is not documented 
or prescribed anywhere, it was clear during the time of the research that the CoCT 
PAC was very well resourced. The secretariat support ensures that timely and high 
quality documentation is available in respect of all meetings and that complete 
records of all committee meetings and decisions are available. The fact that the 
agendas for all meetings are available on the website of the CoCT enables members 
of the public to observe the meetings of the committee. The technical support 
provided by the internal audit directorate clearly and undoubtedly is a key reason for 
the adequate resourcing of the said committee up to this point. This means that 
professionally qualified staff is available to the CoCT PAC throughout the year and 
provides the said committee with the capacity for in-depth scrutiny of the matters 
before it. An independence risk associated with this arrangement, however, as the 
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CoCT PAC is dependent on the extent to which the internal audit division is able or 
willing to continue its support the CoCT PAC activities. 
 
Recommendation 
 
6.17.1 The current level of resourcing of the CoCT PAC must be retained at all 
costs as it is unlikely that the committee will be provided with a 
completely independent secretariat of similar professional seniority. The 
support arrangements with the internal audit division should therefore be 
formalised by council so that the arrangement will not be dependent on 
the good favour of the internal audit directorate or the City Manager.  
 
6.17.2 The internal audit division staff allocated to support of the CoCT PAC 
should administratively report to the head of the internal audit division, 
but should functionally report to the chairperson of the CoCT PAC.  
 
6.17.3 The extent to which the CoCT PAC is entitled to request the internal 
audit directorate to do minor investigations on its behalf should also be 
clarified in the proposed support protocol.  
 
6.18 PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR MEMBERS 
 
No annual minimum training requirement is stipulated for the members of the CoCT 
PAC. In practice, and partly owing to the limited external training opportunities 
available, as well as the inability of the CoCT PAC so far to procure subject matter 
experts for internal training, there has been no meaningful professional development 
for members.  
 
As the first established MPAC in the RSA, the members of the CoCT have the 
potential of sharing their knowledge, skills and experience with the members of 
newly established MPACs. However, such sharing of skills should be preceded by 
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the training in the fundamentals of financial oversight for which interviewed senior 
members of the CoCT PAC have been appealing.  
 
Recommendation 
 
6.18.1    A minimum number of professional development opportunities should be 
stipulated in the committee’s ToR, with one training intervention per year 
being the minimum. 
6.18.2    Long-term advanced planning must ensure that adequate training 
providers are sourced for meaningful training to take place in the 
medium term. 
6.18.3    In view of the format improvements made annually to audit reports, the 
AGSA should be required to present training in changes in the format of 
the audit report once a year before the tabling of the annual report.  
6.18.4   As the first established MPAC, the CoCT PAC should consider making 
itself available to other municipalities that are establishing MPACs of their 
own.  
 
6.19 COUNCIL DEBATES ON COMMITTEE REPORTS 
 
There is no formal requirement for discussion or debate on the reports of the CoCT 
PAC by the council of the CoCT, and in practice no such council discussions or 
debates take place. This is a missed opportunity to highlight important governance 
matters, that all of the members should be interested in or at least be aware of, to the 
whole of the council.  
 
Recommendation 
 
That council should debate the reports of the CoCT PAC at least twice per 
year should be made a requirement. For example, a council debate should 
follow the tabling in the council of the CoCT PAC report on the annual report 
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and the AGSA report. At least one further council debate should take place 
on presentation of the committee’s report on its special investigations.  
 
 
6.20 EXECUTIVE REPONSES TO COMMITTEE REPORTS 
 
There is no formal requirement for the Executive Mayor or the City Manager to 
respond to the committee‘s reports. In practice, the reports are responded to at the 
level of officials and not always at the level of the City Manager.  
 
Recommendation 
 
6.20.1   The System of Delegations should provide for a formal response process, 
including timelines and responsibilities, with a minimum requirement that 
all responses should formally be tabled in council for all councillors and 
interested members of the public to be able to take note. 
 
6.20.2   The main responsibility for providing responses should be that of the City 
Manager, as the accounting officer of the CoCT. However, under certain 
circumstances the CoCT PAC can recommend that the Executive Mayor 
be required to respond to the committee recommendations. (For example, 
when the CoCT PAC has concerns regarding the performance of the City 
Manager.)     
6.20.3   A minimum period of between one or two months from the date of 
adoption of the committee report, the council of the CoCT should be 
stipulated for responses to be submitted to the CoCT PAC via council.  
 
6.21 RECORDS OF MEETINGS 
 
The keeping of detailed minutes or transcripts of proceedings is not a formal 
requirement in terms of the draft ToR of the CoCT. In practice, however, high quality 
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minutes and transcripts of all committee proceedings are produced. It would be a 
misfortune if the production of transcripts of meetings is ever discontinued as has 
happened at a number of provincial legislatures.  
 
 
Recommendation 
 
The ToR of the committee should document the need for minutes of all 
meetings, as well as transcripts of proceedings of all hearings, to be kept. 
Both sets of documents should be available publicly. 
 
6.22 CONCLUSION AND FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.22.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMMENDATIONS: CoCT PAC  
 
The CoCT PAC is more of a PAC in practice than it is on paper. The framework 
documents that provide the committee with its mandate and ToR are inadequate. 
There is no proper guideline available to assist the members of the CoCT PAC to 
interpret their mandate and their ToR, and provide direction with regard to a modus 
operandi. Only six out of a potential of 20 generally accepted PAC practices have 
been adequately formalised. However, the CoCT PAC has managed to successfully 
implement eleven out of 20 generally accepted PAC practices.  
 
There are at least two reasons why the CoCT PAC has achieved the amount of 
success that it has achieved on a practical level. Firstly, there was the strong 
leadership provided by the CoCT through initiating the establishment of an 
independent financial oversight committee based on the generally accepted model of 
a PAC.   From the outset, the CoCT PAC was chaired by a member of the 
opposition, met in public and operated in a non-partisan manner.  
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A second success factor is the quality and dedication of the administrative and 
technical support staff. The CoCT PAC receives professionally prepared documents 
in advance of meetings, and detailed minutes of proceedings are produced after 
meetings. Technical analyses and advice is provided by the staff of the internal audit 
division and detailed reports are produced for tabling in the CoCT council. 
 
The research has, however, identified a number of practices that can be improved. If 
attended to, these practices are bound to make the committee even more effective at 
a practical level. However, it is equally, if not more important to formalise all the 
necessary practices in order to address the lack of clarity that still prevails in respect 
of too many aspects of the committee‘s functioning. It is also important to formalise 
the recommended key practices so that, in the event of a change in the approach of 
the CoCT leadership, or in the event of external factors that are bound to negatively 
impact on the work of the committee, the CoCT PAC will stand a better chance to 
continue its important task unimpeded.  
 
However, the CoCT PAC and all other municipalities function within a sphere of 
government regulated by a number of national statutes. MPACs will benefit greatly if 
the national statutory framework is enhanced in order to assist and facilitate the 
establishment and functioning of MPACs.  
 
The recommendations should also be of use to other municipalities that operate 
MPACs or wish to establish MPACs. 
 
 
6.22.2  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL ACTION IN SUPPORT OF MPACs 
IN RSA 
 
The following recommendations are addressed to the relevant national authorities. 
 
(a) An appropriate national legal framework for the establishment, mandate 
and powers, as well as the key functions of MPACs should be put in place 
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as soon as possible. As it is unlikely that the RSA Constitution will be 
amended in order to provide the non-executive branch of municipalities 
with the same non-executive oversight role and powers as is the case with 
the national and provincial legislatures, the MPAC framework will have to 
be as clear as possible in the form of legislation with regard to the required 
functions and powers of an MPAC. 
 
(b) The Municipal Structures Act offers a simpler route to enhancing the 
statutory framework in respect of non-executive oversight. Section 79 of 
the Municipal Structures Act can quite easily be augmented to include 
provisions stipulating the purpose and process of non-executive oversight. 
Such an amended section 79 should differentiate between the oversight 
functions of policy oversight committees and the oversight functions of the 
PAC as financial oversight committee that deals with policy 
implementation and not policy itself. 
 
(c) It may be possible for municipalities like the CoCT to produce a PAC 
operational guideline based on own research and using own resources. 
However, it will be in the interest of all municipalities in South Africa if a 
central practice guide can be issued by a central authority in support of the 
national statutory framework proposed in paragraph (a) above. Such a 
handbook should be based on generally accepted PAC practice, but must 
incorporate the needs and structural and resource challenges of the 
various municipalities throughout South Africa. 
 
(d) A central authority should initiate a change management programme to 
assist the establishment of municipal PACs. (Responses from 
interviewees during the CoCT case study, as well as feedback during the 
rapid evaluation study carried out in Gauteng in 2008, pointed to huge 
mindset challenges among most stakeholders.) The time is ripe for such 
as change in mindsets given the country-wide programme recently 
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launched by the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs (COGTA), Operation Clean Audits. 
 
(e) Orientation, as well as basic financial oversight skills training for members 
of municipal PACs is required. This should be rolled out at a national level 
to make basic training available to all municipalities and ensure some 
consistency in respect of the core practices, but also to support the 
change management programme.  It would also be most beneficial if 
regional training interventions could take place, possibly facilitated by the 
SA Local Government Association in collaboration with COGTA.  
 
 
 
6.22.3 FINAL CONCLUSION 
 
There is a compelling and urgent need for robust non-executive oversight within local 
government. Financial oversight through public accounts committees has been at the 
apex of non-executive oversight since the 19th century. The CoCT PAC has proven 
that, despite a number of challenges, oversight by a MPAC is feasible and facilitates 
improved management of public resources, improved accountability and generally 
better governance in a municipality.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Interview Guide for City of Cape Town Public Accounts Committee 
 
Name of person interviewed Position  Contact detail  
 
 
 Cell: 
 
Email: 
 
Introduction and warm up 
Background – Interviewer and interviewees names and brief background about what each does.  
Warm up – brief explanation of the purpose of the interview – the fact that it is a semi-structured interview 
with open-ended questions; briefly explain the interview agenda – key focus areas of the interview, number 
of questions that will be asked and the anticipated duration of the interview. 
 
 
Discussion Topics Prompts 
History and evolution of your MPAC:    The CoCT 
had started thinking about the establishment of a 
PAC since 2003.... 
 
Do you know why the CoCT decided to establish a 
public accounts committee? 
 
 
 
 
Is there still support for the existence of the committee? 
 
 
Can you please explain how the committee 
operates – its mandate and main focus, its 
relationship with Council, etc? 
 
Your ToR refers makes reference to you being a 
“mechanism for oversight over the expenditure of public 
money” but a key focus area is the oversight report 
finalisation process - that may not leave time for detailed 
financial scrutiny?  
 
How do matters get referred to the Committee, and by 
whom?  
 
Public accounts committees usually do not consider 
matter referred by an executive structure like MAYCO?    
Do you think it problematic? 
 
How successful is your committee’s relationship with the 
Finance Portfolio and the Audit Committee? 
 
How important do you think it is for the Committee to 
initiate own investigations? 
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Discussion Topics Prompts 
 
Do you think the committee meets regularly enough? 
 
How important is it for your committee to hold meetings 
in public?  
 
And how important is media coverage?  
 
How effectively does Council process your reports?  
 
 
What have been the achievements or successes of 
the committee since you have been involved? 
 
 
 
What impact have do you think you’ve had on the affairs 
of council?  
 
What is the general view in Council about the role and 
value of the committee?  
 
What is management’s view of the committee? 
 
Which of your activities or outputs do you regard as most 
effective? 
  
How the committee members experience their 
oversight responsibility and work in this 
committee? 
 
SCOPA members generally complain that there is too 
much work involved in this type of committee  
 
What would assist to motivate members more as far as 
SCOPA work is concerned? 
 
What effectiveness challenges has your committee 
faced in the past, or do you currently face? 
 
 
 
Is your mandate and ToR clear?   
 
Do you think the mandate / ToR adequate?  
 
Does your committee have adequate powers? 
 
Do you have adequate resources?  
- Technical & administrative support? 
- Support from the AG? 
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Discussion Topics Prompts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How have these challenges been addressed, or how 
could they possibly be addressed? 
 
 
 
Are members appointed for the full term of Council? 
 
What about member skills and training opportunities? 
 
Do operate in a non-party partisan manner? 
 
Are the officials with whom you engage senior enough? 
 
What about calling members of MAYCO to account? 
 
How effective is your committee’s follow up actions? 
 
 
Who do you think should chair a municipal public accounts committee, and why? 
 
 
 
 
ONLY IF TIME PERMITS 
Do you think it is an option at all for a municipal PAC to co-opt outside experts in order to bring some expertise 
to the committee? 
 
 
 
What do you think is the future of the MPAC in the CoCT? 
 
 
 
 
Closing 
Thank you for granting me the opportunity to discuss this important issue with you and for the valuable 
information and insights that you have shared. I might call you if there are any serious information gaps in my 
transcripts. 
 
Thank you 
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Appendix 2 
 
Name of interviewee Position / function Contact detail 
Date of 
interview/s 
Mr Piet Gouws First and former 
chairperson of CoCT PAC 
and current member  
12 Hertzog Boulevard  
Cape Town  
9 October 2009 
Mr Peter Gabriel  Incumbent chairperson of 
the CoCT PAC and 
member of official 
opposition 
Tel: 0842290883 14 October 2009 
Mr Patrick Hill  Senior majority party 
member on CoCT PAC 
 
Tel: 0833806565 22 October 
 
Ms Zulpha Abrams 
 
 
Head: Internal Audit 
Directorate, City of Cape 
Town (210 councillors) 
 
Zulpha.Abrams@cape-
town.gov.za 
 
  
18 September and 
16 October 20009 
Ms Sonja Johnson Audit Manager: SCOPA 
(CoCT PAC ) 
Directorate Internal 
Audit 
Tel: 021 400 9374 
Fax: 021 400 3367 
18 September and             
25 September 
2009 
Mr Lesley Holland  AGSA audit operations 
leader in Western Cape  
  
lesleyl@agsa.co.za 
Tel: 021-5484100  
26 September 
2009 
Mr TV Pillay Chief Director: National 
Treasury  
tvpillay@treasury.gov.za  6 October 2009 
Ms Anel Powell City reported, 
Cape Times  
 
apowel@inl.co.za 
 
16October 2009 
 
 
 
 
